

Contents

3 _____ **JOURNAL STAFF**

4 _____ **EDITORIAL POLICY**

6 _____ **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

8 _____ **IMF INVOLMENT IN GABON: *A Hidden Failure***
By: Haley Brott

23 _____ **DEPENDENCY THEORY AS VIEWED THROUGH SMALL STATES**
By: Eric Case

33 _____ **GETTING WARRIORS TO NEGOTIATE: *The Effect of U.S. Mediation on the Conflict in Northern Ireland***
By: Edwin D. Critchlow

51 _____ **THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE HOLY SEE: *A Content Analysis Pope Francis' Papacy Through A Constructivist Viewpoint***
By: Rebekah Didlake

64 _____ **BOKO HARAM AND THE MISMANAGEMENT OF THE NIGERIAN STATE**
By: Ian Laettner

85 _____ **HUMANITARIAN AID AND INTERVENTION: *The Responsibility for Action During the Ebola Epidemic***
By: Noora Larson

101 _____ **ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE**
By: Crystal O'Connor

Journal Staff

Spring 2015

Managing Editors

Raja Sutherland

Eduardo Gonzalez

Ryan Neach

Wesley Moar

Editors

Nan-Nan Jiang

Madelyn Brown

Chris Tronoff

Vic Masilang

Diane Fox

Krystal Prasad

Ka Chio

Deedra Latham

Maysan Hamid

Timnit Gabreiohannes

Daniel Mariano

Writers

Haley Brott

Alyssa Hoofard

Noora Larson

Eric Case

Chrystal O'Conner

Ilyass Oudghiri

Ian Lattner

Edwin Critchlow

InDesign Team

Charlotte Ohrbom

Erika Cruz Guevarra

Editorial Policy

.....

Overview

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JOURNAL at San Francisco State University strives to exhibit the diverse range of undergraduate and graduate research interests that flourish in our department.

Each semester, the *Journal* is offered as a course in which students participate as writers or editors in a peer review process, or as administrative staff members who assist authors and editors as well as guide the *Journal* through its production.

The goal of the course is to expose students to the peer review process, focusing on academic standards of argumentation and factual accuracy, citation formatting, and collaborative editing using Microsoft Word's "track changes" feature. More broadly, the *Journal's* executive editors aim to help students develop writing/editing skills applicable in other courses and promote a deeper understanding of the discipline of International Relations as a whole.

Submissions & Process

The *Journal* encourages all students pursuing a B.A. or M.A. in International Relations to submit completed works (incomplete papers and abstracts are not accepted) at the beginning of each semester. From these submissions, the *Journal's* executive editors assign students to positions on the writing and editorial boards as well as a number of administrative-level appointments.

The course curriculum includes a number of informational workshops and at least three rounds of structured editing and revision. All editing is anonymous and each submission is reviewed by three different editors.

The structured peer review is as follows: ^[1] a submission is first edited by an undergraduate or graduate "peer expert" who has conducted prior research on topics and/or regions relevant to the paper and can thus provide fact checking and citation suggestions; ^[2] second round editing focuses on clarity and academic tone my paring the manuscript with an editore unfamiliar with the paper's subject; ^[3] finally, the paper is edited for proper citation

formatting and technical aspects. At the end of the semester, authors participating in this process are expected to submit a final manuscript for consideration by the *Journal's* executive editors and the faculty advisor.

Publication of Articles

Only submissions that have gone through the peer review process and meet the content and formatting requirements will be considered for publication. The *Journal* is published yearly.

For Submissions and Back Issues:

<http://internationalrelations.sfsu.edu/content/international-relations-journal-o>

For all other inquiries:

Department of International Relations
1600 Holloway Avenue/HSS Room 336
San Francisco, California 94132
PHONE: 415.338.2654/ FAX: 415.338.2880

Statements and opinions expressed in *The International Relations Journal* are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Editors, the Editorial Board, the Faculty Advisor, or the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University.

Acknowledgements

THE STAFF OF THE International Relations Journal is grateful for the continued funding allocated by the Instructionally Related Activities Committee and the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University for the production of this journal.

The production of this journal is a group effort and the managing editors would like to especially thank all the members of the editorial board and the contributing writers. The editorial board members edited the articles contained in this issue and both the editors and writers patiently endured the labor of multiple revisions of these articles, as well as corresponding with one another. The guidance and advice of Dr. Burcu Ellis in the International Relations Department has been indispensable to the publication of the Journal.

SPECIAL THANKS to Charlotte Ohrbom and Ericka Cruz Guevarra for doing the graphic design for this year's journal and their unwavering help in the creation of this publication.

ABSTRACT » *The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has granted states loans for decades, implementing a series of market-based reforms called structural adjustment plans. One African country, Gabon, has been a part of the IMF since 1963, and has been receiving loans ever since. Even so, it is important to focus on the years 1995-2014 for the purpose of this paper. I will be focusing on how the IMF's structural adjustment programs have negatively affected women in Gabon, despite the fact that the GDP of Gabon has risen. By focusing on female employment, social services, and infrastructure in Gabon I argue that IMF structural adjustment plans affect women differently because they overlook gender. Therefore, women are negatively affected by structural adjustment plans due to the fact that they are ignored by mainstream development plans.*

.....

IMF Involvement in Gabon: A Hidden Failure

» by *Haley Brott*

I. Introduction

When World War II came to an end, many countries in Africa sought independence, and after gaining sovereignty they began to plan for economic development.¹ There are two major institutions that helped with short and long-term development plans, the International Monetary Fund,² and the World Bank respectively. With that being said, this paper will focus mainly on the actions taken by the IMF rather than those taken by the World Bank. The IMF's mission is as follows: "to help ensure stability in the international system. It does so in three ways: keeping track of the global economy

and the economies of member countries; lending to countries with balance of payment difficulties; and giving practical help to members."³ In order to fulfill their mission of ensuring stability within the international system, the IMF has the ability to grant loans to developing states, provided that said states agree to conform to a set of market-based reforms called Structural Adjustment Plans. These structural adjustment plans require a developing state to cut back spending on social services such as health care and education, lowering trade barriers, reducing tariffs, lifting subsidies, privatizing the public sector, and opening up border to foreign investors.

With a required decrease in spending on social services, states receiving loans are forced to cut social welfare programs, and significantly decrease spending on education and healthcare. These spending cuts have

1 C. Norwood, "Re-Thinking the Integration of Women in Population Development Initiative," *Development in Practice* 19(7), (2009): 906-911.

2 "Our Work," International Monetary Fund, accessed on October 29, 2014, <https://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm>

3 *Ibid.*

a significant impact on the people of a state, especially the women and children. The IMF declares that cutting spending in social services will help to balance the states' budget. Despite this, many developing nations have difficulty educating their citizens and providing a decent healthcare system for their citizens even with IMF intervention. For example, in Gabon only 3.2% of the GDP is spent on healthcare yearly, providing only 6.3 hospital beds and .29 doctors per every 1,000 Gabonese-ranking them 179th in the world-despite the fact that Gabon has been a member of the IMF since 1963.⁴ With a decrease in spending on social services, such as the two previously states, it is less likely that females will have access to education and healthcare, because these opportunities will generally be reserved for men, despite the important role women play in economic stability and development.

Women play a significant role in the development of a state, a role which cannot be ignored. With IMF structural adjustment plans, little to no attention was paid to women and children specifically, for many believed that these two populations would benefit from programs that benefitted the state as a whole.⁵ Even so, women did not seem to benefit from the economic development plans that were geared towards a state as a whole. It is important for women to be included in societal and economic development for a variety of reasons. First of all, women exist, and they account for roughly half of the world's population. Second with a growing world population-and a general assumption that population size is associated with poverty-those bearing children, with increasing options of contraceptives, are of great importance to economic development.⁶ Third, women are increasingly involved in the workplace, often times supporting the agricultural sector in African states.⁷

Due to the fact that structural adjustment plans lack a focus on gender, it is difficult for structural adjustment plans to truly benefit a state, for they are lacking focus on roughly half of the population. How have the IMF's structural adjustment plans affected women? I argue that IMF structural adjustment plans affect women differently because they overlook gender. Therefore women are nega-

4 "The World Factbook: Gabon," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed December 1, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gb.html>

5 A. Tickner, "What is Your Research Program? Some Feminists Answers to International Relations Methodology Questions," *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1) (2005): 1-21.

6 Norwood, "Re-thinking the Integration of Women in Population Development Initiative," 906-911.

7 "Two Aspects of Women's Work Load in Africa," International Fund for Agricultural Development, accessed December 1, 2014 <http://www.ifad.org/gender/learning/role/workload/61.htm>

tively affected by structural adjustment plans due to the fact that they are ignored by mainstream development plans. This paper will proceed as follows: a review of literature regarding gender and development as well as Feminist contributions, a rebuttal by Institutionalists, a case study focused on Gabon from 1995-2014, a brief analysis, and finally a conclusion derived from the presented analysis.

II. Gender and Development

Around the time of the 1970's and 1980's, it became clear to many that gender and development would become an important issue regarding development issues and programs.⁸ There are a variety of reasons why it is important to include gender analysis in development programs, including the fact that women generally account for half of a state's population, and the idea of "differing roles of men and women and the social construct of gender" which vary from state to state.⁹ Before the 1970's it was assumed that development was "gender-neutral" and would benefit men and women equally.¹⁰ Even so, many development plans leading up to the 1970's and 1980's were failed attempts, and Karl attributes the high rate of failure in the development programs to a "neglect or lack of knowledge of women's productive and reproductive roles."¹¹ Due to this fact, it was important for women and gender to be included in development programs.

Feminist Contributions

Development cannot be entirely achieved without a focus on gender analysis, as well as the effect of institutions on men and women separately. Ann Tickner explains how epistemological differences between different theories prevents Feminists and Institutionalists from using the same methodological analysis.¹² Institutions and those who form the policies are inherently gender-blind because they do not use the same methodology that authors such as herself use in regard to policies. Without looking at the viewpoint of women, or even taking women into account, it is virtually impossible for structural adjustment plans to be in any way beneficial to women.

8 H. Warren, "Using Gender-Analysis Frameworks: Theoretical and Practical Reflections," *Gender and Development* 15(2) (2007): 187-198.

9 Ibid

10 M. Karl, *Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision Making*. (London: Zed Books, 1995).

A. Rao, *Gender Analysis in Development Planning: A Case Book*. (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, (1991).

11 M. Karl, *Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision Making*, 94.

12 Tickner, "What is your Research Program? Some Feminists Answers to International Methodology Questions," 1-21

V. Spikes Peterson focuses more on the inherently gender-blind ideas of policy makers, and the idea of the gendered nature of the current world.¹³ Peterson argues primarily that institutions, state administration, and development programs consistently glaze over women due to the fact that the current world is gendered, viewing women as less powerful than men. It is much less likely for women to achieve power within any government position, and if a women does gain power she may personify “female virtues,” such as the traditional view of women being motherly.¹⁴

Complimenting these ideas are the principles that underpin the ideas of Diane Elson. Elson argues heavily that the world has become extremely gendered due to different ideas of “masculine” and “feminine.” More importantly, structural adjustment plans put in place by the IMF are inherently detrimental to women because the macroeconomic ideas underpinning these plans are entirely gender-blind.¹⁵ These same plans are often times blind to impoverishment as well as the wasting of resources. Rather than simply stating what is wrong with the current gendered world order, Elson takes her ideas one step further to create possible solutions for the problem of policy-makers consistently ignoring gender. Through the use of gender-analysis even greater development can be achieved, for without the development of half of the population, it is virtually impossible for a state to succeed in overall economic development.¹⁶

Solutions and Training

In order to integrate gender-analysis into development programs, it is necessary for gender and development theorist to train those creating development programs in both gender training and gender-analysis training. The former consists of different ideas to inform “and equip.... persons with the skills to enable them to address gender inequalities in their work...”¹⁷ Similarly to this, gender-analysis training looks at making important skills and tools available to those creating policy. This includes ensuring that those being trained gain true knowledge of the ideologies that underpin the necessity of gender-analysis in development programs.

13 A. Runyan & V. Peterson, *Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

14 Ibid.

15 D. Elson, “Gender Awareness in Modeling Structural Adjustment,” *World Development*, 23(11) (1995): 1851-1868.

16 Ibid.

17 N. Acquaye-Baddoo & D. Tsikata, “Gender Training and Trainers in Ghana in *Gender Training in Ghana: Politics, Issues, and Tools*, (Accre: Woold Publishing Services, 2001), 61.

Warren explains how it is not simply about giving the tools to policy makers and letting them figure the rest out, but it is imperative to provide tools for the policy makers, and also training as to how those tools can be integrated into development programs. Gender and development theorists must ensure that gender is taken into account throughout their work, and that it also promotes equality between genders.

Institutions and the Promotion of Development

While the IMF is directed with the view that the liberal international economic order is the most efficient economic order, Keohane and Martin support the development of all states through cooperation and multilateral institutions.¹⁸ Keohane explains how institutions have transformed the world, and have become a huge part in forming the current world order.¹⁹ While he notes that institutions are not always entirely effective, he explains how the world order, as well as powerful states, have become increasingly reliant on institutions to maintain cooperation as well as achieve political and economic goals. Keohane touches on the fact that within any agreement between multiple states there is bound to be an ounce of possible uncertainty and a questioning of state credibility. Institutions can help with collective gains and reducing the level of uncertainty and distrust between separate states.²⁰ By reducing the amount of distrust and uncertainty, Institution-*alists* assume that states can help those around them with development or other issues due to a sort of friendship through cooperation.

Martin also believes that institutions can greatly increase cooperation, as well as decrease violence regarding relations between states. She argues that institutions help with economic growth throughout the world and also help to create an interdependence between states that can allow for peaceful means, such as economic sanctions, to show one states disapproval of another state's actions.²¹ In her opinion, institutions cannot only promote economic development through interdependence, but also increase the cooperation between multiple states, decreasing the frequency of states engaging in force or violence.²²

18 R. Keohane & L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20(1) (1995): 39-51.

19 R. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* 110 (1998): 82-96.

20 *Ibid.*

21 L. Martin, "Credibility, Cost, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," *World Politics* 45 (1993): 406-432.

22 *Ibid.*

Are Institutions Always Effective?

It is extremely important to take a look at multiple perspectives within a debate in order to bring attention to the nuisances as well as the inconsistencies within each theoretical perspectives. Even so, it is clear that the ideas of Tickner, Spikes Peterson, and Elson, along with the ideas regarding integration of gender into development through different forms of training are much more beneficial to answering the question of how IMF structural adjustment plans affect women. Without taking a look at gender studies and gender analysis it is impossible to formulate a hypothesis or an opinion on this issue. Because of this, this paper will be focusing on different variables through a gendered lens, analyzing how structural adjustment plans affect women.

III. Methodology

Throughout the rest of this paper I will be looking how structural adjustment plans have affected women in Gabon from the approval of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan from the IMF on November 8, 1995 to present day. During this period of time I will be focusing on female employment, social services, as well as infrastructure. I will be using empirical data pertaining to the three stated variables as well as official IMF documents in order to show how women have been overlooked by IMF intervention. Using this data I will then analyze how the IMF's structural adjustment plans effect women, specifically in Gabon.

IV. IMF Intervention in Gabon

Political Independence to Economic Dependence

Gabon gained their independence from France on August 17, 1960, and they became a member state of the IMF in 1963. Even so, for the purpose of this paper I will be focusing on the time period of November 8, 1995, when the IMF granted Gabon an EFF loan of \$165 million, to present day.²³ When the IMF approved this loan, they intended to do a number of things. First, the IMF implemented a broad range of structural adjustment plans to help Gabon grow in non-oil sectors, revise the labor code, and privatize important public facilities.²⁴ The IMF also stated they would provide job training courses and counseling regarding employment in order to grow the labor force. Between 1995 and 1999 the male unemployment rate was indeed decreased from 18.0% to 16.9%, but the female

²³ "The World Factbook: Gabon."

²⁴ "Gabon and the IMF," International Monetary Fund, accessed December 1, 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/country/gab/index.htm>

unemployment rate rose from 19.5% to 22.4% and has since then risen even higher to 26.5%.²⁵

Since IMF intervention in 1995 Gabon has become one of the wealthiest sub-Saharan African nations based on a per capita GDP of \$19,200.²⁶ However, Gabon also shows one of the highest rates of inequality with the wealthiest 20% of the population receiving 90% of the income, and 1/3 of the Gabonese people remaining under the poverty line.²⁷ In order to analyze how the IMF's structural adjustment plans have affected women in Gabon I will be focusing on three key variables: female employment rates, social services such as healthcare and education, and infrastructure respectively.

Unequal Employment

While the unemployment rate of men has consistently been on the decline since the 1995 EFF loan, the unemployment rate of women has consistently been on the rise.²⁸ In Gabon 60% of the labor force is concentrated in agriculture, with 95% of agricultural jobs belonging to women, and 15% of the labor force is concentrated in the industrial sector.²⁹ Even so, only 3.6% of the GDP is made up of the agricultural sector while 63.9% of the GDP is made up of the industrial sector, with a major focus on oil.³⁰ This fact points again to the large gap between classes, the lack of economic freedom for those excluded from the industrial sector, and the inequality between those living in urban areas, such as Libreville, and those living in the rural North. With the majority of women holding jobs in the agricultural sector it is virtually impossible for them to gain economic freedom and close the gap between themselves and those who are rich off of oil, leaving women at a major disadvantage.

Depleted Social Service Programs

Additionally, since the EFF loan of 1995, Gabon has continued to struggle in the social services sector, specifically in the areas of healthcare-including improved drinking water and sanitation facilities- and education. With only 2.6% of the yearly GDP spent on healthcare, it is difficult for citizens to receive

25 "Unemployment, Female," World Bank, accessed October 29, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS>

26 "The World Factbook: Gabon."

27 "U.S. Relations with Gabon." US Department of State, accessed December 1, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm>

28 "Unemployment, Female."

29 "The World Factbook: Gabon." Central Intelligence Agency.

30 Ibid.

care.³¹ In fact, the life expectancy rate has remained constant at 62 years old from 1990-2009, even with improved medical technology.³² Furthermore, only 55% of children are able to receive measles immunizations, and it is virtually impossible for medicine to be found in the public sector.³³ Without a substantial income or insurance, it is extremely difficult for the Gabonese living in rural areas to obtain any medication, and women are often left without medicine because it is reserved for the males in the family.

Since the IMF cut government spending on education, it has become increasingly difficult for women to receive an education, for this right is generally reserved for the males in the family first. In Gabon only 80% of women over 15 are literate, while 92% of men are literate.³⁴ Because of this, women are often stuck in the role of caretaker or agricultural worker. Also, women are often times given the responsibility of educating their daughters from home, for the sons of the family are generally more likely to receive an education.

Infrastructure and Development

Finally, it necessary to take a look at the infrastructure of Gabon in order to assess how women are affected by the IMF development programs and structural adjustment plans. In African countries, specifically in rural areas, women are in charge of cooking, collecting firewood, and collecting water. With only 3 km of total water pipelines throughout Gabon, there is a complete absence of piping in the rural areas.³⁵ Due to this, women are often forced to walk miles at a time in order to collect water for the family. This can be long and strenuous even on paved roads, but 9/10 of Gabonese roads are unpaved and women have to walk along rough, uneven roadways in order to collect the water.³⁶ In addition to this, only 63% of those in rural areas have access to improved drinking water, leaving 37% of the rural population at a very high risk of waterborne and water contact diseases such as bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, typhoid fever, and schistosomiasis.³⁷ Continuing along this trend is the fact that only 32% of the rural population and 42.9% of the urban population have access to improved sanitation facilities,

31 "World Health Statistics," World Health Organization. (2011). Accessed October 29, 2014, http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS2011_Full.pdf

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 "Children out of School, Primary," The World Bank, accessed October 29, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.UNER.MA/countries>

35 "The World Factbook: Gabon."

36 Ibid.

37 "World Health Statistics."

despite the fact that Gabon has one of the highest GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, and the IMF states that they focused on improving infrastructure in Gabon.

V. Analysis

The IMF makes the case that they are extremely helpful to developing countries. Despite this, many of the states receiving loans and assistance from the IMF have not seen economic improvement, but increased inequality between genders and socio-economic classes. This paper examined three distinct variables: employment rate of women, social services, and infrastructure. The first variable examined was the employment rate of women, as compared to the employment rate of men. While the unemployment rate of men was lowered by 1.1% after an EFF loan from the IMF in 1995, the unemployment rate of women rose by 3%.³⁸ I would directly attribute the rise in female unemployment to the IMF's structural adjustment plans that called for an elimination of subsidies on the agricultural industry. When subsidies and trade barriers are eliminated, prices will decrease and domestic produce can no longer compete with imported produce, leading to a decrease in available jobs and an increase in unemployment. While 60% of the Gabonese work force is concentrated in agriculture, 95% of those in agriculture are women.³⁹ When the sector where most women work is no longer granted subsidies and profits begin to plummet, it is no surprise that women begin to lose their jobs.

The second variable I examined in this paper was social services, such as healthcare and education. Again, I can directly relate the less than average healthcare provided by Gabonese government and the low literacy rates directly to the IMF structural adjustment plans. The IMF required a tightening of the budget in order to avoid debt. To do this, Gabon substantially cut spending in regards to both healthcare and education, in fact only 3.2% of the yearly GDP is spend on healthcare, leading Gabon to currently have the same life expectancy it had in 1990.⁴⁰ The literacy rates in Gabon also remain extremely low, despite the fact that this state has one of the highest GDPs in Sub-Saharan African, and it is difficult for females to get an education, for this privilege is reserved for men first. While women are not given the chance to receive an education, it is difficult for them to find jobs in the industrial sector, or in the privatized sector. Even so, agricultural jobs are no longer promising for women in Gabon due to a lack of subsidies, as

38 "Unemployment, Female." "Unemployment, Male," The World Bank, accessed October 30, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS?page=3>

39 "The World Factbook: Gabon."

40 Ibid.

stated previously. As lack of spending in healthcare and education tie into unemployment, it becomes even clearer that structural adjustment plans are especially detrimental to women.

Finally, the third variable taken into account was infrastructure. There is little infrastructure tailored for the public good which leads 37% of the rural Gabonese population with unimproved drinking water and around 70% of the rural and urban population without access to improved sanitation. Although there are only 3 km of water pipelines in Gabon, there are roughly 160 km of oil pipelines.⁴¹ This makes it clear that the government has the money to build pipelines, but they find it more important to build the pipelines for oil and a profit, rather than for the people. While the IMF required a tightening of the budget, as stated before, the already corrupt Gabonese government spends the majority of their money fixated on gaining a profit. Because of this, there is a shortage of roads throughout Gabon, and 9/10 of the roads are not paved.⁴² In this aspect, the IMF was clearly detrimental to the state of Gabon, however the negative impacts were, and still are, felt by the population as a whole, not only the women.

The three variables examined clearly show that the IMF negatively affects women in Gabon, but it also shows a vast degree of economic inequality, and a lack of spending on social services and infrastructure that are extremely important to the development and sustainment of a state. While half of the Gabonese population is virtually left in the dust through IMF structural adjustments and development plans, I believe it is near impossible for Gabon to achieve a lower degree of economic inequality and a lower rate of poverty.

VI. Conclusion

The three independent variables examined in this paper clearly show that IMF structural adjustment plans negatively affect women. After taking a closer look at literature regarding gender and development, Feminism, and Institutionalism, it is clear that policy makers and IMF leaders must have an open approach in regards to gender. It is necessary for policy makers to see the impact their programs have on women, whether they be good or bad, in order to help benefit the state as a whole, rather than simply the men on the state. Even so, this hypothesis could be strengthened with the addition of further research and comparisons between different cases. Should further research take place, it is important to look at the impact of structural adjustment plans in states within different regions. It

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

is also important to look at the effects of development programs geared towards women, not only on women, but on the state as a whole. With this added research a stronger hypothesis could be formed and techniques to include gender in structural adjustment plans could be developed.

Works Cited

- Acquaye-Baddoo, N & Tsikata, D. "Gender Training and Trainers in Ghana." In *Gender Training in Ghana: Politics, Issues, and Tools*, 61. Accre: Woold Publishing Services, 2001.
- Elson, D. "Gender Awareness in Modeling Structural Adjustment." *World Development* 23(11) (1995): 1851-1868.
- International Monetary Fund. "Gabon and the IMF." Accessed December 1, 2014. <http://www.imf.org/external/country/gab/index.htm>
- International Monetary Fund. "Our Work." Accessed October 29, 2014. <https://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm>
- Karl, M. *Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision Making*. London: Zed Books, 1995.
- Keohane, R. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* 110 (1998): 82-96.
- Keohane, R & Martin, L. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20(1) (1995): 39-51.
- Martin, L. "Credibility, Cost, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." *World Politics* 45 (1993): 406-432.
- Norwood, C. "Re-Thinking the Integration of Women in Population Development Initiative." In *Development in Practice* 19(7) (2009): 906-911.
- Rao, A. *Gender Analysis in Development Planning: A Case Book*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1991.
- Runyan, A. & Peterson, V. *Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium*. Boulder,: Westview Press, 1993.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Fact Book: Gabon." Accessed December 1, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gb.html>
- Tickner, A. "What is Your Research Program? Some Feminists Answers to International Relations Methodology Questions." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1) (2005): 1-21.

International Fund for Agricultural Development. "Two Aspects of Women's Work Load in Africa." Accessed December 1, 2014, <http://www.ifad.org/gender/learning/role/workload/61.htm>

US Department of State. "U.S. Relations with Gabon." Accessed December 1, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm>

Warren, H. "Using Gender-Analysis Frameworks: Theoretical and Practical Reflections." *Gender and Development* 15(2) (2007): 187-198.

The World Bank. "Children out of School, Primary." Accessed October 29, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.UNER.MA/countries>

The World Bank. "Unemployment, Female." Accessed October 29, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS>

The World Bank. "Unemployment, Male." Accessed October 30, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS?page=3>

ABSTRACT » *This article serves to bring attention to the disparities of wealth between countries and to provide a lens by which to view economic inequality in the international system. By focusing on impoverished small-state case studies, I explore the theoretical framework through which they are currently understood, and then provide my own. I then prescribe affirmative action policies that may begin to close the North-South economic gap.*

.....

Dependency Theory as Viewed Through Small States

» by *Eric Case*

There is a debate within the international community on how to resolve the inequality and massive disparity of wealth between affluent and impoverished countries.¹ Most Western scholars and liberal economists would say that poor countries are poor because they have not fully opened their markets or have yet to discover their comparative advantage, and until they do they will not progress to the next stage of development.² Other scholars, especially in the developing world would refute the position of Western scholars and liberal econ-

omists.³ Instead, they would suggest that the cause of poverty is not in the inability to move towards a free market economy, but because of a flaw in the liberal economic system and in the exploitive history of the Global North. The Global North took advantage of the Global South, which has resulted in a widening economic gap between countries in the geographic North and those in the South. The explanation for why this gap exists between the Global North and the Global South is called dependency theory. This article will seek to evaluate the validity of dependency theory, by exploring this approach through an analogy inspired from Immanuel Wallerstein's

1 The United Nations has defined around 50 countries as Least Developed Countries and around 115 as developing economies.

2 Note, the liberal economic theories developed in the 18th-19th centuries by Adam Smith and David Ricardo have remained largely unchanged and serve as the body of 21st century liberal economic theory (e.g., Milton Friedman).

3 Scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Theotonio Dos Santos, André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, George Beckford, and Angotti Thomas were influential in developing external causation theory and dependency theory.

World-Systems Theory and by looking at small state case studies of Dominica, Nauru, and Kuwait. Small states were chosen because poverty has a greater impact on these countries due to their limited territory and population size.




Figure 1. Core dominated global economy

When discussing dependency theory, it is necessary to explain that the North-South gap develops out of colonialism and imperialism. In the textbook *Global Politics*, authors Juliet Kaarbo and James Lee Ray explain how colonialism created a parasitic relationship between the ruling states and their subjugated territories. Kaarbo and Ray state, “minerals were exported, with profit going to the colonial powers, economic expertise was often limited to the colonists, and the colonial power. Luxury crops such as coffee were planted to serve the needs of the home populations of the colonial powers.”⁴ This relationship was certainly beneficial to the North, as they grew and developed from the capital and resources gained at the expense of the South. “The

South, on the other hand, was forced to remain agrarian, its economic and political structures were dominated and molded to serve the interests of the colonial states and it lagged behind the development in the North.”⁵ Dependency theorists point to this exploitative relationship and underdevelopment as one of the initial sources of the North-South gap.

When the colonies did gain their independence they struggled to compete in a global economy dominated by the North. For the majority of former colonies, their first decades of independence were spent establishing an infrastructure and political society that was not reliant on their former colonial masters. However, many newly independent states still witnessed sluggish or stagnant economic growth, which lead some to become banana republics or indebted to their former

4 Juliet Kaarbo and James Lee Ray, *Global Politics*. 10th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011), 339.

5 *Ibid.*

colonial powers, this remains a major problem today.⁶ In the textbook *Understanding Contemporary Latin America* author Richard S. Hillman explains how this problem of dependency and reliance could exist, using Immanuel Wallerstein's interpretation of dependency theory. "Wallerstein's vision of a capitalist international economy (features) 'core' states that extract cheap labor and resources from 'peripheral' states."⁷ In Wallerstein's description of the global economy, the "core" states which benefit from the "peripheral" states are the former colonial powers and the Global North. The "peripheral" states which are exploited for their cheap labor and resources are the former colonies and the Global South. Figure 1 illustrates Wallerstein's description in action, with the addition of "semi-peripheral" states, which are the newly industrialized countries that enjoy varying levels of trade with the core states. In Figure 1 the arrows represent the flow of resources and capital moving from the peripheral and semi-peripheral state bubbles to the core state bubbles. It must also be noted that core states can both trade amongst themselves and receive resources from the peripheral and semi-peripheral states. But peripheries will generally only export to the semi-peripheries, who will then have limited trade with the cores. This cycle perpetuates the concentration of wealth within the core states.

Another way of looking at dependency theory is through the Santa Claus (SC) analogy. In the SC analogy, Santa Claus represents the "core", the children around the world represent the "semi-periphery", and the elves in the workshop represent the "periphery". The SC analogy plays out just like Christmas, with elves making presents that go to Santa Claus, and then Santa Claus distributing wrapped presents to children around the world in exchange for milk and cookies. Relating this back to a global economic view, Santa Claus (the core) receives presents (primary products) from the elves (the periphery). Santa Claus (the core) then distributes wrapped presents (manufactured products) to the children (the semi-periphery) in exchange for milk and cookies (currency and other goods). While analogies are useful for introducing a theory, trying to understand the concept through abstract means can be challenging. To better understand the idea of dependency theory it is helpful to look at case studies. Because no two states are completely the same, I will look at how the North-South gap has affected a small state, how it is affecting a small state, and how it will affect a small state.

6 A state (e.g., Honduras) whose economy is highly dependent on the sale of primary resources (generally fruit) to foreign markets typically in the North.

7 Richard S. Hillman, *Understanding Contemporary Latin America*. 3rd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 182.

Dominica is a small island country, a former British colony, and one of the poorest states in the Caribbean. It gained its independence from Great Britain in 1978 and has since found difficulty establishing a reliable source of income. Its economy is dependent on tourism and agriculture (predominantly bananas). However, because Dominica lacks white sand beaches and has limited development it struggles to compete in tourism against its close French controlled island neighbors, Guadeloupe and Martinique. Dominica's extremely mountainous terrain and heavy rainfall make cultivating bananas and other crops challenging, and competing against large American corporations like Dole and Chiquita has resulted in relatively low profits. For a short time Dominica was able to reliably support itself through preferential trade with the United Kingdom. However, preferential trade with former colonies was stopped by the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the behest of Dole and Chiquita, because they saw it as an affront to free trade. Presently Dominica has made attempts to diversify its economy by making secondary products, like soaps and oils that are extracted from their crops. Still, Dominica is unable to completely expand beyond agricultural production and a reliance on foreign tourism. "In 2003, the (Dominican) government began -restructuring of the economy -including elimination of price controls, privatization of the state banana company, and tax increases- to address an economic and financial crisis, and meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements."⁸ Despite this, since 2003 Dominica has been unable to find a reliable source of income to fund its economy or pay its large debt (large relative to its economy's size) to the United States of America and the United Kingdom. This has trapped Dominica in a cycle of dependency where Dominica depends on the United States and United Kingdom to purchase its goods. However, these profits are never enough to fully pay off the debt owed to the United States and United Kingdom, therefore Dominica is forced to request additional loans in order to sustain the country and pay existing debts. This inability to support its economy or compete in a Global North dominated international economy shows the massive gap between Dominica and the economic power of the Global North.

The tiny island nation of Nauru has been struggling to establish a stable source of income and has succumbed to the pressures of an international economy dominated by the Global North. Unlike Dominica, Nauru has been able to profit from its comparative advantage in the form of phosphate exports. However, this comparative advantage has proved to be unreliable, as Nauru has since exhausted its easily accessible phosphate deposits and has not yet discovered a viable

8 Central Intelligence Agency. "Dominica: Economy Overview", *The World Factbook*.

replacement industry. During the 1960s and 1970s Nauru enjoyed economic prosperity brought on by “intensive phosphate mining (over) the past 90 years -mainly by a United Kingdom, Australian, and New Zealand consortium- has left the central 90% of Nauru a wasteland and threatens limited remaining land resources.”⁹ Presently, Nauru faces a dilemma as it looks for ways to fund its economy.¹⁰ In 2007 a new layer of phosphate was discovered, which “may last another 30 years,” but continued mining will cause further damage to Nauru’s territory.¹¹ Since the collapse of its mining industry Nauru has become highly dependent on states from the Global North, primarily Australia. The North provides a variety of services, including economic support and commercial endeavors, which generate some wealth for Nauru.¹² This transition by a rentier state going from economic prosperity to foreign reliance is further evidence to support the widening North-South gap.

The small desert state of Kuwait situated in the Persian Gulf, is a special case for understanding dependency theory. Unlike other states in the Global South, Kuwait benefits from good trade with the Global North, and generates high revenues from its exports. Yet, Kuwait is entirely reliant on its trade relationship with the North. Like Nauru with phosphate rock, Kuwait enjoys high profits from exporting petroleum. However, like Nauru’s did, Kuwait’s economy could suffer greatly when its resource and primary way of funding services runs out. This could lead to further problems because “petroleum accounts for nearly half of (Kuwait’s) GDP, 95% of export revenues, and 95% of government income.”¹³ To further exacerbate the problem, “around 90% of (Kuwait’s) citizens -work for the public sector, either directly for the government or for a state owned enterprise of some sort,” which all rely on the oil industry, meaning there would be an extreme unemployment crisis if Kuwait were to not create other industries before its petroleum runs out.¹⁴ This is further worrisome because unlike the

9 Central Intelligence Agency. “Nauru: Environment Overview”, *The World Factbook*.

10 Note, the Asian Development Bank issued a report titled *Country Operations Business Plan: Nauru 2013-15*, which advises Nauru on improving its domestic economy. The report recommends Nauru “focus on private sector development and strengthening public sector management” (1).

11 Central Intelligence Agency. “Nauru: Economy Overview”, *The World Factbook*.

12 Note, Australian companies conduct and manage phosphate mining operations, thus a majority of the revenue goes to Australia and not Nauru. Aside from mining, Nauru also relies on Australia leasing Nauru’s territory. Nauru hosts a processing facility for refugees seeking asylum in Australia, in return Nauru receives rent payments from Australia.

13 Central Intelligence Agency. “Kuwait: Economy Overview”, *The World Factbook*.

14 Michele Penner Angrist. *Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East*. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013), 381.

United Arab Emirates, which has been developing alternative industries (tourism and finance), Kuwait has done very little to prepare for the end of its oil industry. “In 2010, Kuwait passed an economic development plan that pledged to spend up to \$130 billion over five years to diversify the economy away from oil, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy.”¹⁵ Despite these claims “Kuwait has done little to diversify its economy over the years.”¹⁶ This is because Kuwait has become content with the status quo of high profits and because of conflicting plans for the future of Kuwait’s economy between the National Assembly and the Kuwaiti Government, progress towards developing new sources of income has been nonexistent. Kuwait must act before its oil runs dry. Ideally, Kuwait will establish alternative industries that help sustain its population’s lifestyle, but most likely Kuwait (like Dominica and Nauru) will struggle to compete against the North in the international economy once it no longer profits from a comparative advantage.

There is one small state which is an exception to the dependency theory concept of the Global North and the Global South, especially when looking at former colonies. This outlier is the small city-state Singapore (and to some degree the other Asian Tigers: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong). Singapore is a special case when looking at how a small state has been affected by the North because it was able to succeed in creating a stable comparative advantage while others have failed. Singapore was able to do this however, by “breaking the rules” of the capitalist international economy; similarly to what Dominica and the United Kingdom did through their preferential trade agreements. However, instead of preferential trade, Singapore practiced protectionism and import substitution industrialization (ISI) to establish its own industries and boost its economy so that it could compete against the North. As one of the few small states to succeed in the present liberal market, Singapore should be a model for other small countries to follow. However, it would be impossible for states to implement protectionist policies and develop the way Singapore did without severe criticism from the IMF, the WTO, and the Global North.

Dependency theory is a valid lens to explain the economic gap that exists between the Global North and the Global South as it examines both the parasitic colonial relationship between the North and the South and the present economic

15 Central Intelligence Agency. “Kuwait: Economy Overview”, *The World Factbook*.

16 Martin Hvidt, “Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends,” *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, January 2013, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/economic-diversification-in-the-gcc-countries.pdf>

exploitation of the North and the South. The economies of Kuwait and Nauru are highly reliant on the North purchasing their resources. In Nauru, we have seen how this reliance has caused problems when the state has not diversified its economy or established an alternative industry. Unfortunately, diversifying an economy, establishing alternative industries, and discovering a comparative advantage is easier said than done. When looking at the Dominica case study it is evident that Dominica has done everything in its power to practice liberal economics. However, Dominica has been unable to become successful and establish itself due to the dominance of companies and industry from the North. Short of the international community adopting affirmative action type policies (like preferential trade) to support states that have been exploited, there is little hope that the North-South gap will ever be resolved.

Works Cited

- Sheldon Anderson, Jeanne A.K. Hey, Mark Allen Peterson, and Stanley W. Toops. *International Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Global Issues*. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2013.
- Angrist, Michele Penner. *Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East*. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. , 2013.
- Asian Development Bank. “Country Operations Business Plan: Nauru 2013-15.” *Country Operations Business Plan*. September 2012. <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/33654/files/cobp-nauru-2013-2015.pdf>
- Central Intelligence Agency. “Dominica: Economy- Overview.” *The World Factbook*. October 24, 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/do.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency. “Kuwait: Economy- Overview.” *The World Factbook*. June 20, 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency. “Nauru: Economy- Overview.” *The World Factbook*. October 24, 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nr.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency. “Nauru: Environment- Overview.” *The World Factbook*. October 24, 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nr.html>
- Michael Cox, and Doug Stokes. *US Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. ,2012.
- Juliet Kaarbo, and James Lee Ray. *Global Politics*. 10th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011.
- Grove, Andrea K. *Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support Across Borders*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Hillman, Richard S. *Understanding Contemporary Latin America*. 3rd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005.

- Hvidt, Martin. "Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends." *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, January 2013, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/economic-diversification-in-the-gcc-countries.pdf>.
- Masselman, George. *The Cradle of Colonialism*. Binghamton, New York: Yale University Press, 1963.
- O'Neil, Patrick H. *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. 3rd. ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. , 2010.
- Rogoziński, Jan. *A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib to the Present*. New York: Plume, 2000.
- Weber, Cynthia. *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*. 4th ed. London: Routledge, 2014.

ABSTRACT » *The purpose of this research is to test whether participation by radical factions affects the outputs and acceptability of negotiated conflict agreements. This article examines the Northern Ireland conflict (The Troubles), and compares conflict context, agreement text, and participant contributions to the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements. The history of Britain-Ireland conflict from 18th century to present is reviewed with an emphasis on the 20th century Troubles and the US intervention in negotiating the Belfast Agreement. It finds evidence that US involvement brought disparate political parties that were excluded from the Sunningdale talks into the Belfast negotiations, and that previously-ostracized stakeholders contributed new clauses and articles to the Belfast Agreements. It concludes that competent third-party intervention is conducive to bringing and keeping radical stakeholder in negotiations. It suggests radical stakeholder participation builds agreements which are more enduring because they are acceptable to a wider spectrum of the conflict communities.*

.....



Getting Warriors to Negotiate: The Effect of US Mediation on the Conflict in Northern Ireland¹

» by *Edwin D. Critchlow*

.....

In early December of 1973,² in Sunningdale, England – about 40 kilometers west of London – the British and Irish governments, and representatives of parties of the nascent Northern Ireland Executive issued a communiqué following their conference to discuss the establishment of a Council of Ireland.³ This tripartite agreement would come to be called the Sunningdale Agreement. It was an attempt to end the nearly two-year long, direct rule of Northern Ireland by the United Kingdom government in London (Westminster), to pacify the escalating violence of The Troubles, and to assuage the Roman Catholic minority by giving them greater say in and great protections from the Northern Ireland government in Belfast (Stormont).⁴ Political parties in the Northern

Ireland Assembly that favored Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom (Unionists) rejected the Council of Ireland. Within months, a crisis brought on by a Unionist-lead, general led to the collapse of the

-
1. The author would like to thank Professor Sophie Clavier for her helpful suggestions and James Z M Wong for guiding and motivating me to write this paper.
 2. Joseph E. Thompson, *American Policy and Northern Ireland* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 41.
 3. Great Britain, *North Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972*, (London: The Stationary Office, 1972)
 4. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/22/pdfs/ukpga_19720022_en.pdf; Gerry Adams, *A Farther Shore*, (New York: Random House, 2003), xiv. Martin Melaugh, “The Sunningdale Agreement - Chronology of Main Events,” CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland, CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/chron.htm>.

governing, power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive.⁵

On April 10, 1998 (Good Friday) in Belfast, Northern Ireland, the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and most of the major political parties in Northern Ireland signed two interrelated documents called the Belfast Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement.⁶ It is considered a major development in the success of the on-going Northern Ireland peace process and a foundation of Northern Ireland governance.⁷⁸ While some politicians have derided the Belfast Agreement as no different than the Sunningdale Agreement, while others have pointed to significant differences in the content of the text, the context of the struggle, the conditions of the negotiations, and the execution of the policies laid out in the agreement.⁹

Two key differences in the conditions of the Sunningdale versus Belfast negotiations were: one, the participation of all the major factions of the Northern Ireland polity (moderate and radical); and two, the intercession of the United States government as mediator. It has been suggested that conflict negotiation among moderates will fail to garner wider approval. Only when radicals are brought to the table, do negotiations have a chance to find a broadly acceptable resolution to the conflict. The failure of the Sunningdale Agreement and the success of the Belfast Agreement offer a chance to explore the validity of this proposition.

This paper will explore how the participation of previously excluded, radical political parties affected the content of the agreement. First, it will review the history of the Northern Ireland conflict in the context of British/Irish history. Then, it will contrast the texts of the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements to find differing clauses, articles, and policies. It will then examine past statements and critical assessments of the newly participating parties to ascertain whether the new policies can be attributed to the new participants. Further, this paper will explore the role of the United States in bringing the radical parties into the negotiation process. It will attempt to determine if Washington's

5. Thompson, *American Policy and Northern Ireland*, 200.

6. Bertie Ahern, "In Search of Peace," *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 27.

7. Conor O'Clery, "Sunningdale Failed Partly Because Mainstream Republicans and Unionists Were Not on Board," *Irish Times (Dublin)* April 6, 1998, 5.

8. Thompson, *American Policy and NI*, 207.

9. Suzanne McCorkle and Melanie J. Reese, *Mediation Theory and Practice* (San Francisco, CA: Pearson Education, 2005), 81.

participation was necessary or merely sufficient to bring the previously ostracized groups into the talks. It will make that determination by reviewing writings and comments by the participating negotiators and mediators.

In *Mediation Theory and Practice*, the authors view as “problematic” negotiations which exclude any of the stakeholder (or their authorized legitimate negotiators).¹⁰ Authors Suzanne McCorkle and Melanie J. Reese define stakeholders as persons who have a substantial and direct interest in the outcome of the negotiations.¹¹ They give a practical introduction to and instructions for mediating conflict. McCorkle and Reese concede it may be unwieldy to convene all the stakeholders in one venue, so they advise conducting separate meetings between the disputants when a single meeting is impractical.¹² They also, acknowledge the stakeholders may not be available or competent to negotiate, and therefore may choose to send a surrogate to participate in the mediated negotiations. For the outcome of the negotiations to be accepted by all parties, the authors assert the participants in the negotiations must have the authority to make concessions and offers on the part of the stakeholders.¹³ In the case of communities in conflict, representatives must be seen as legitimate by their communities to make agreements that will be accepted by the communities. Further, if chosen representatives of a faction of the community are excluded from the negotiations, that faction is likely to reject any agreement negotiated in their absence. These assertions and reasoning seem to be in line with Kumar Rupesinghe’s advice to identify all influential actors, and his admonition against exclusively relying on highly visible and articulate elites. He offers the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Sri Lanka as cautionary examples.¹⁴ Kumar Rupesinghe is active in, and knowledgeable of, international and intra-national conflict resolution.^{15 16}

10. McCorkle and Reese, *Mediation*, 80.

11. *Ibid.*, 81

12. *Ibid.* 81; Kumar Rupesinghe, “Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri Lanka,” in *Resolving International Conflicts*

13. Rupesinghe, “Mediation in Internal Conflicts,” 167.

14. Rupesinghe, “Mediation,” 264.

15. I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no. 1, (September 2001): 8, http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_1/issue_1/zartman.pdf.

16. Joseph Campbell, *Successful Negotiation: Trieste*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 73.

Suzanne McCorkle and Melanie J. Reese glean their insights from teaching civil and business mediation. The thesis that all disputants must be included in negotiation seems to hold across all levels of conflict: family, victim-offender, community, organizational, national, and international.

Some theorists in international conflict resolution suggest a conflict must reach a certain “ripeness” before negotiations are likely to succeed.¹⁷ They point to a military stalemate as a necessary condition (though not necessarily sufficient) for likely success of negotiations.¹⁸ Other theorists, from the field of international political economy, assert lack of broadly shared economic prosperity as an impetus for community members to resort to use of violence. These academics further assert if wealth is perceived as equitably shared between elites and plebeians, it is less likely that a country will experience domestic terrorism.¹⁹ Neither a martial impasse nor economic inequality seems germane to this Sunningdale/Belfast case. The following overview of the history of the British/Irish conflict will demonstrate that neither of these factors contributed to differences in the agreements.

The mere proximity of Britain and Ireland has contributed to their long history of cultural, linguistic, economic, technologic, political, and military interactions.²⁰ Though their common history can be dated to the at least the twelfth century, activists and historians have pointed to 1608 or 1609 as the first significant event in what would become the British/Northern Irish conflict.²¹ It was early in the seventeenth century that large numbers of English, Welsh, and Scottish settlers colonized the northeastern portion of the island and established a garrison in Ireland called the Plantation of Ulster.²² By the mid-seventeenth century, the displaced and dispossessed native people rose in a

17. I. William Zartman, “Timing,” 9.

18. S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Akila Weerapana, “Economic Conditions and Terrorism,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 20, no. 2 (2004): 477.

19. John Darby, “Northern Ireland: The background to the Peace Process,” CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland, CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm#history>.

20. Mari Fitzduff and Liam O’Hagan, “The Northern Ireland Troubles,” CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland, CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper09.htm>.

21. John Darby, “Conflict in Northern Ireland,” in *Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* ed. Seamus Dunn, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/facets.htm#chap2>.

22. Adams, *A Farther Shore*, xi.

revolt which was put down by Oliver Cromwell.²³ Famously, in 1690 the last Catholic monarch of England, the dethroned James II, was defeated at the Battle of Boyne (near Drogheda, Ireland) by the Protestant King William of Orange.²⁴ Soon anti-Catholic laws were introduced to restrict the predominantly Catholic, culturally-Irish population from accessing education, public office, and owning land or livestock.²⁵

Over the next two centuries as the British consolidated their power over the Irish there would be many uprisings.²⁶ In 1800, in a move to further consolidate power, the British government abolished the Irish Parliament and brought Ireland directly under the power of Westminster as a single United Kingdom with the Act of Union.²⁷ Over the course of the nineteenth century several movements – some political, some militant – attempted to overturn British control.²⁸ In the early twentieth century, the Irish nationalist movement gained the political and military upper hand, and established its own parliament.²⁹ However, in north-eastern Ireland where they had a demographic majority, Protestants Unionist prepared to use force to resist absorption into an independent Ireland.³⁰

As a compromise, in 1921, the island was partitioned with twenty-six independent southern counties which would become the Republic of Ireland, and six north-eastern counties which remained in political union with the United Kingdom as Northern Ireland.³¹ Some Irish nationalist accepted the partition while others did not. The newly independent state fell into a bitter civil conflict over this compromise. Many Irish nationalist (Republicans) viewed the partition as “unfinished business” and sought to unite the entire island into one state.³² From 1956 to 1962, the century-old military group, the Irish Republican

23. Fitzduff and O’Hagan, “The Northern Ireland Troubles.”

24. Adams, *A Farther Shore*, xi-xii.

25. John Darby, “Conflict in NI.”

26. John Darby, “Conflict in NI.”

27. Adams, *A Farther Shore*, xii.

28. Fitzduff and O’Hagan, “The NI Troubles.”

29. *Ibid.*

30. John Darby, “Northern Ireland.”

31. John Darby, “Conflict in NI.”

32. Adams, *A Farther Shore*, xiii.

33. David E. Schmitt, “Bicommunalism in Northern Ireland,” *Publius* 18, no. 2 (Bicommunal Societies & Politics, Spring 1988): 33.

Army (IRA) which had taken part to the Land War of the nineteenth century and the Irish War of Independence, launched a border campaign against Northern Ireland.³³

With the partition of Northern Ireland as a semi-autonomous province of the United Kingdom, a bicomunal political order was established. Bicomunalism can be defined as “a political system in which two distinct communal groups comprise at least 80 percent of the population” of the jurisdiction.³⁴ The numerical domination of the Protestants in Northern Ireland is reflected in the Westminster-style, first-past-the-goal-post electoral process to the political exclusion of Roman Catholics in government. To redress this lack of representation and other social inequities, a predominantly Catholic civil rights movement arose in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.³⁵ Unionist paramilitary groups attacked their peaceable, civil rights marches.³⁶ To repel to these attacks and the British troop presence in Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA formed in Northern Ireland.³⁷ In the early 1970s, the violence between the Provisional IRA and the British Army intensified.³⁸

Throughout United States history, Washington had taken little note of political affairs in Ireland. Despite the massive immigration of Irish escaping the Great Hunger in the mid-nineteenth century, and a dozen US Presidents with Irish ancestry, American administrations treated the British/Irish conflict as a domestic matter within a sovereign state.³⁹ In the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations viewed Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. Their administrations refrained from pressuring Westminster to resolve the Irish Question, even after the abhorrent, 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre in which soldiers killed thirteen unarmed civilians.⁴⁰ For their part, the British

34. Ruth Wallsgrave, “Interview: Sinn Fein” (interview of Mairead Keane), *Off Our Backs*, 19, no. 10 (November 1989): 13.

35. Fitzduff and O’Hagan, “The NI Troubles.”

36. John Darby, “Conflict in NI.”; Fitzduff and O’Hagan, “The NI Troubles.”

37. Adams, *A Farther Shore*, xiv.

38. Joseph E. Thompson, “United States - Northern Ireland Relations,” *World Affairs* 146, no. 4 (Spring 1984): 318; Adams, *A Farther Shore*, 147.

39. Thompson, “US – NI Relations,” 318.

40. Keith Kyle, “Sunningdale and After: Britain, Ireland and Ulster,” *The World Today* 31, no. 11, (November 1975): 439.

refused to accept participation by foreign states in meetings regarding Northern Ireland.⁴¹ British government officials of the time also adamantly rejected any contributions or participation by Irish-Americans.⁴² Westminster conducted the negotiations for the Sunningdale Agreement only with parties it considered appropriate and germane to the conflict: the Irish government, and political parties represented in the Unionist dominated Northern Ireland Executive. Though the Executive did include moderate Irish Nationalists, it lacked any representatives from the radical Republicans and was majority Unionists.⁴³ Only after personal lobbying of President Carter by prominent Irish-American congressional figures, Senator Ted Kennedy and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neil, did US foreign policy address the Northern Ireland Question. Even then, Carter chose to focus American attention on human rights issues.⁴⁴

During the 1980s, Westminster attempted to address human rights and social inequality issues from the ground up. The UK launched community based programs to “ensure in equality of opportunity and equity of treatment”, “increase cross community contact”, and “encourage greater mutual understanding”.⁴⁵ These initiatives alleviated the economic inequalities between the Protestant and Catholic communities. Irish Catholics perceived their fortunes as approaching par with their Protestant counterparts, yet terrorist violence continued to escalate.⁴⁶

While it refused foreign contributions to resolving the conflict, Westminster also excluded Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, from the 1991 peace talks ostensibly because Sinn Fein refused to renounce violence.⁴⁷ In 1994, Sinn Fein announced a Provisional IRA ceasefire, and yet they were still refused

41. The British Lord Chancellor became enraged at the notion of a prominent Irish-American intervening in a British domestic issue, slapping his desk and fuming, “How dare they interfere!” from Adams, *A Farther Shore*, 147.

42. Thompson, *American Policy and NI*, 41.

43. Thompson, “US – NI Relations,” 319.

44. Colin Knox, “Conflict Resolution at the Microlevel: Community Relations in Northern Ireland,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 4 (December 1994): 596.

45. Maria Godoy, “Timeline: London’s Explosive History,” NPR, July 7, 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4734400>.

46. Vancouver Sun (Vancouver, BC), “Northern Ireland Begins Talks for Peace,” June 17, 1991, sec. A, 5.

47. Neal Ascherson, “Even After 25 Years, Our Ignorance about IRA is Almost Total,” *The Independent* (London), September 4, 1994, 18.

seat at the negotiation table.⁴⁸

In the twenty-five years between the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreement the negotiations continued to evolve. The Framework Document from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland governments of February 22, 1995 acknowledged the right of Northern Ireland self-determination whether to secede. The Document also created the Northern Ireland Assembly, ended the Republic of Ireland's claim to Northern Ireland, and set-up cross border institutions. However, despite all this progress on key issues, the major breakthrough in negotiations would come only after former-US Senator George Mitchell became involved in the talks and formerly-excluded radical parties participated in direct negotiations.

This review of the history of the British/Irish conflict demonstrates that the twenty-five year period between the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements is brief in the scope of the centuries-long conflict. There had been ample "ripe" moments in the course of the conflict. Most notably just prior to the Great War, when Irish nationalists had the advantage on the island, and reached a military stalemate in Northern Ireland. The compromise settlement did not satisfy all the nationalist factions, indeed it led to a civil war in the newly independent Irish state. The Catholic minority saw their economic conditions improving towards equity with the Protestant majority in the 1980s, yet the terrorist attacks on British targets intensified and widened during that period. It was not until nearly the end of the next decade that a successful deal was brokered. Neither military stalemate nor economic equity seems to correlate to the success of the negotiations. Assuring that all stakeholders are included in direct talks may prove to correlate to all factions accepting the negotiated agreements.

The next section of this paper will examine the differences between the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements. It will then find the sources of the policies that differ between them. Though each of the new elements that appear in the Belfast Agreement is not attributable to a new participant, the rebalanced power dynamic likely allowed the non-Unionist parties to form coalitions to have their policies included in the final document.

48. Stefan Wolff, "Context and Content: Sunningdale and Belfast Compared," in *Aspects of the Belfast Agreement*, ed. Rick Wilford, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), quoted in BBC, *The Good Friday Agreement*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/northernireland/schools/agreement/agreement/support/ba_c081.shtml.

The parties to the Sunningdale Agreement included the United Kingdom (UK), the Republic of Ireland (RoI), six members of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), four members of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and one member of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).⁴⁹ In addition to these participants, the Belfast Agreement negotiations, moderated by a United States representative, also included the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC), Labour (L), and Sinn Fein (SF).⁵⁰ In his examination of American involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, Joseph E. Thompson summarizes each agreement. He sees the five major components of the Sunningdale Agreement as:

1. The Irish government must be included in the Northern Ireland governance structure;
2. A majority of Northern Irish voters must consent to changes in the status of the province;
3. Establishment of a Council of Ireland composed of 30 representatives from Northern Ireland and 30 from the Republic of Ireland;
4. Establish institutions for cross-border security and justice;
5. Britain would devolve governance of the province to Northern Ireland politicians.⁵¹

Thompson summarizes the five major components of the Belfast Agreement as:

1. Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom so long as that is the wish of the majority of its residence;
2. Devolution of executive and legislative powers, with safeguards and oversight of human and community rights, to the Northern Ireland Assembly;
3. A North-South Ministerial Council accountable to both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Republic of Ireland Parliament to be created promptly;

49. Stefan Wolff, "Context and Content."

50. Thompson, *American Policy and NI*, 41.

51. Thompson, *American Policy and NI*, 200.

4. A British-Irish council planned;

5. A new British-Irish Agreement to be negotiated after the above four policies are in place.⁵²

When these basic points are compared, there seems to be much repetition between them. The Belfast agreement merely seems to be a more detailed version of the Sunningdale. By way of comparison, the 1973 tripartite communiqué is four pages long while the text of the multiparty agreement is thirty-five pages. Stefan Wolff, in his overview of the core content of the Agreements notes the similarities, and finds some differences. His table explicates these differences:

Table 1

The content of the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements compared.

	Sunningdale Agreement	Belfast Agreement
Signatories	UK, <u>RoI</u> , UUP, SDLP, APNI	UK, <u>RoI</u> , UUP, UDP, PUP, NIWC, L, APNI, SF, SDLP
Consent principle		
Self-determination		
Reform of the policing system		
Prisoners		
Bill of Rights		
Abandonment of violence		
Security co-operation		
Cross-border co-operation		
Recognition of both identities		
Intergovernmental co-operation		
Institutional role for the <u>RoI</u>		
Power-sharing	Implied	
Inter-island co-operation		
Devolution of powers		

Source: Stefan Wolff, “Context and Content”.

From Wolff’s assessment, it is clear the differences between the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements are the right of the Northern Irish to self-

52. John Murray Brown, “Mitchell seeks backing for Northern Ireland Plan,” *Financial Times* (London), April 7, 1998, 1.

determination, the mutual recognition of both identities, an explicit statement of power-sharing, and inter-island co-operation. The inclusion of each of the new elements in the Belfast Agreement can be traced to one of the participants in the negotiations.

The SDLP long sought to form a cabinet-style, power-sharing government to safeguard the interests of the two communities.⁵³ Such an arrangement would divide the government's portfolios among the various parties in the Assembly and force them to work together to manage the state, or allow them to check each other's power. The NIWC party originated from the northern and southern Irish civil rights movements of late sixties and seventies. In Northern Ireland, women were active in the civil rights movements that sought equitable access to housing and social services, and fair representation in government. In the Republic of Ireland, women were inspired by the women's liberation movements in the UK and US. North and south, women were active, but chose not to take up the issue of partition.⁵⁴

The NIWC tends to look beyond the Unionist/Republican divide to health, education and childcare issues.⁵⁵ There is evidence that Irish feminists attempted to expand self-determination to a broad, individual-level to national-level definition and appropriate it for their movement.⁵⁶ However, the platform of self-determination is more strongly associated with Sinn Fein. Unreservedly, Republican public intellectuals lay out the case for Irish self-determination.⁵⁷ And, political leaders of Sinn Fein made vociferous demands for national self-determination by all the residence of the island.⁵⁸ On the issue of inter-island co-operation, it was the Republic of Ireland that pressed for North-South institutions.

53. Wallsgrave, "Interview: Sinn Fein," 13.

54. David Sharrock, "Peace Women Unite at Ballot Box to Take on Party Dinosaurs," *Daily Mirror* (London), May 29, 1996, 6.

55. Claire Hackett, "Self-determination: The Republican Feminist Agenda," *Feminist Review* 50 The Irish Issue: The British Question (Summer 1995): 111.

56. Niall Meehan, "Right of Self-determination" (letter to the editor), *Irish Times* (Dublin), March 7, 1996, 13.

57. Michael O'Regan, "Delegates Disagree on Peace Process," *Irish Times* (Dublin), February 27, 1995, 7.

58. John Murray Brown, "Once More to the table," *Financial Times* (London), January 12, 1998, 19.

As late in the negotiations as January 1998, the Republic of Ireland refused to bargain away the notion of the Assembly as a North-South power-sharing body with executive powers that the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland had agreed to in Framework Document of 1995.⁵⁹

Though the Republic of Ireland was hesitant to accept it, the North-South Ministerial Council, put forward by Tony Blair, was the compromise that allowed for autonomy for the Northern Ireland Assembly, and a blended North-South institution of inter-island co-operation with defined executive powers.⁶⁰ The inclusion of the recognition of both identities seems to come from an unexpected quarter. The Progressive Unionist Party, a newly formed, young, Protestant faction seems to have pushed forward this agenda. The PUP leader, David Ervine, presumed a “parity of esteem” for Catholics, and called for “an end to their second-class citizenship”.⁶¹

As demonstrated, at least some of the new elements are attributable to the newly included actors. It is generally accepted by the negotiators that the skills and attitude of George Mitchell made the opportunity for previously ostracized radical factions to join the talks, and for most of the parties to bear through the difficult and often uncivil discussions. National and political party leaders believed that Mitchell contributed a positive attitude into the negotiation, and his wisdom and patience made the accords possible.⁶² David Adams of the Ulster Democratic Party, the political wing of Unionist, Protestant street militias, credited Mitchell with getting warriors to negotiate. While John Hume, leader of SDLP and Nobel laureate, credited Mitchell with patience in maintaining contacts with all parties.⁶³ George Mitchell’s personal background and career likely made him a uniquely appropriate, neutral and skilled moderator. Though he is descended from an Irish family by the name of Kilroy, he was unaware of this in his childhood as he was adopted and raised by a Maronite, immigrant Lebanese family.⁶⁴ As United States Senate Majority Leader he is accustomed to heated negotiations and finding creative solutions to seeming impasses.

59. David Wastell and Alan Murray, “Irish Government Vetoes Peace,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, (Ottawa, ON), January 11, 1998, A12.

60. Nick Cohen, “Forty Shades of Orange Ulster Unionism Now Appear to Have Many Strands of Opinion,” *The Observer* (London), June 9, 1996, 1.

61. John S. Day “World’s Highest Honors May Come to Sen. Mitchell,” *Bangor Daily News* (Bangor, ME), April 16, 1998, 1; The Belfast News Letter, “American George is Irish Person of Year,” Nov 10, 1998, 7; Thompson, *American Policy and Northern Ireland*, 200;

62. T.R. Reid, “Countdown to Peace,” *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), April 6, 1998, D13.

63. Reid, “Countdown to Peace,” D13.

64. The Maronite Church is an Eastern Rite, Catholic Church centered in Lebanon.

In conclusion, this paper has substantiated the thesis, the inclusion of radical factions in moderated negotiations contribute positively to the acceptability of the settlement by the affected communities. It has shown that the new policies can be attributed to once-ostracized, radical, or newly formed participants. Further, this document has demonstrated that the efforts of the US mediator were instrumental in bringing the radical factions into the negotiations.

Works Cited

- Adams, Gerry. *A Farther Shore*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Ahern, Bertie. "In Search of Peace." *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 26-31.
- Ascherson, Neal. "Even After 25 Years, Our Ignorance about IRA is Almost Total." *The Independent* (London), September 4, 1994, 18.
- Belfast News Letter, The. "American George is Irish Person of Year." Nov 10, 1998, 7.
- Blomberg, S. Brock, Gregory D. Hess, and Akila Weerapana, "Economic Conditions and Terrorism", *European Journal of Political Economy* 20, no. 2 (2004): 463-478.
- Campbell, Joseph. *Successful Negotiation: Trieste*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Cohen, Nick. "Forty Shades of Orange Ulster Unionism Now Appear to Have Many Strands of Opinion." *The Observer* (London), June 9, 1996, 1.
- Darby, John. "Conflict in Northern Ireland." In *Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, edited by Seamus Dunn, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/facets.htm#chap2>.
- Darby, John. "Northern Ireland: The background to the Peace Process." CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland. CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet). <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm#history>.
- Day, John S. "World's Highest Honors May Come to Sen. Mitchell." *Bangor Daily News* (Bangor, ME), April 16, 1998, 1.
- Fitzduff, Mari and Liam O'Hagan. "The Northern Ireland Troubles." CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland. CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet). <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper09.htm>.
- Godoy, Maria. "Timeline: London's Explosive History." *NPR*, July 7, 2005. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4734400>.

- Great Britain. North Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972. London: The Stationary Office, 1972, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/22/pdfs/ukpga_19720022_en.pdf.
- Hackett, Claire. "Self-determination: The Republican Feminist Agenda." *Feminist Review* 50 The Irish Issue: The British Question (Summer 1995): 111-116.
- Knox, Colin. "Conflict Resolution at the Microlevel: Community Relations in Northern Ireland." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 4 (December 1994): 595-619.
- Kyle, Keith. "Sunningdale and After: Britain, Ireland and Ulster." *The World Today* 31, no. 11 (November 1975): 439-450.
- Meehan, Niall. "Right of Self-determination" (letter to the editor). *Irish Times* (Dublin), March 7, 1996, 13.
- Melaugh, Martin. "The Sunningdale Agreement - Chronology of Main Events." CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland. CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/chron.htm>.
- McCorkle, Suzanne, and Melanie J. Reese. *Mediation Theory and Practice*. San Francisco, CA: Pearson Education, 2005.
- Murray Brown, John. "Mitchell seeks backing for Northern Ireland Plan." *Financial Times* (London), April 7, 1998, 1.
- Murray Brown, John. "Once More to the table." *Financial Times* (London), January 12, 1998, 19.
- O'Clery, Conor. "Sunningdale Failed Partly Because Mainstream Republicans and Unionists Were Not on Board." *Irish Times* (Dublin) April 6, 1998, 5.
- O'Regan, Michael. "Delegates Disagree on Peace Process." *Irish Times* (Dublin), February 27, 1995, 7.
- Reid, T.R. "Countdown to Peace." *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), April 6, 1998, D13.

ABSTRACT » *In four hundred years, there has been one non-European Pope, Argentinean Jorge Mario Bergoglio, also known as Pope Francis. Through gaining global popularity and gracing the cover of Time magazine three times, including receiving the title as Person of the Year in 2013, Francis demonstrates that personality matters in leadership and influences foreign policy decisions. By looking at Time's coverage through a constructivist lens during his first year in papacy, this paper will show that media is a tool for a state to attain soft power and widen global influence. Coding reoccurring themes, subjective media rhetoric, and chosen quotes, Time has framed Francis as more left leaning through the style and image he portrays to the media. Francis has used the media as diplomatic tool and now the world watches and waits for anticipated change to occur, but for how long and to what extent, only time will tell.*

.....

The Curious Case of the Holy See: A Content Analysis Pope Francis' Papacy Through a Constructivist Viewpoint.

» *by Rebekah Didlake*

Introduction

Four hundred years have passed since the last non-European Pope has headed the Holy See. Pope Francis has captivated the media and created a plethora of conversation among Catholics and non-Catholics for many of his unorthodox and untraditional decisions and rhetoric. A leader of a transnational church with membership surmounting a billion people, the head of the Holy See, a globally recognized participant in global relations and politics, Pope Francis is anticipated to catalyze change within the Church and worldwide. Francis gained instantaneous popularity upon his appointment but deciphering whether his global presence and popularity stems from extensive media coverage

or whether he is really departing from past Vatican policies is important when looking at personalities role in leadership in International Relations.

Through a constructivist lens, this paper will analyze the importance of soft power in regards to foreign policy by looking at the pope as a public diplomat. Secondly, this paper will analyze media framing and its role in Pope Francis' widespread popularity. Through this methodology, this paper will aim to determine if the media is exacerbating Pope Francis' progressive ideology and if his personality influences the Vatican's foreign policy.

The Different Faces of Power

The definition of power is a matter of debate in International Relations. Neo realists like Thomas Hobbes, author of *Leviathan*, only factor in military, economic, and financial ability when measuring the power of a state. On the other hand, constructivist Joseph Nye coined and defined the term soft power in his article *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* by first defining power as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” and then introducing soft power as more than “just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument...but also the ability to entice and attract”.¹ In other words, money, tanks, and military are not the only means to measure power but instead its image and perception that others have can increase a countries influence and strength. A country’s soft power has the ability to entice other countries to do what that country wants and the creation and capability of that power is worth analyzing.² According to Nye, soft power has three levels: culture, political values, and foreign policies. This paper will primarily focus on the foreign policy aspect, defined by Nye as a country’s “moral authority” and gained through active public diplomacy.³

Because a states leader often carries out public diplomacy, we must examine personality of leadership as an aspect of influence. Realists, like Kenneth Waltz, believe that a nation will act in the self-interest of the state, apart from the personality of the leader but constructivists disagree. Byman and Pollack explore Kenneth Waltz’ realist claims of image in international relations through a constructivist lens in their article *Let Us Now Praise Great Men*. The first claim, criticized by Waltz himself and tackled by Pollack and Byman, is the theory that actions and behaviors of the state come from the behaviors of individuals.⁴ In the case of Adolf Hitler, he took actions despite the opposition of other voices and eventually transformed the opposition into submission to gain more power.⁵ Although personality cannot alone explain actions,

1 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (2008): 95, URL <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672331>>

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 97-98.

4. Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let us Now Praise Great Men: Brining the Statesman Back In.” *International Security* 4, no. 4 (2001): 111, URL <<http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/3092135>>.

5. Ibid.

differences in personalities could explain variance of events in international relations.⁶ Now, we must examine the different aspects of public diplomacy and how and if leaders personality influence foreign policy.

Diplomacy has many goals and different strategies to achieve those goals. Candace White and Danijela Radic, authors of *Comparative Public Diplomacy: Message Strategies of Countries in Transition*, defined six types of public diplomacy: advocacy, communicational, relational, promotional, warfare/foreign policy propaganda, and political strategy.⁷ The epitome of soft power, diplomacy gives nations the opportunity to pursue their goals through individuals. As public diplomacy has evolved since the Cold War, it has become a significant part of international relations. Behind closed door meeting still exist but Nye claims public diplomacy focusing on public opinion can become as influential as classified diplomatic meetings.⁸ White and Radic studied messaging strategies of EU membership countries diplomats and found that informational diplomacy was most frequently used but least effective and advocacy diplomacy used least but most influential.⁹ In addition, globalization and the rise of the information age have further intensified diplomatic efforts.

The rise of social media, the spread of the Internet, and popularity of the smart phone, make information attainable instantaneously to millions of people worldwide. Because of the information age, public diplomacy can be considered a nation's international public relations.¹⁰ People have access to an exponential amount of information and therefore have to choose what information to absorb and pay attention too, as Nye calls the "paradox of plenty" where attention becomes more powerful than the information.¹¹

For this reason, mass media has become an important actor in diplomatic efforts and attaining soft power. Reporters, editors, and news organizations help channel information in a digestible manner through framing and choosing

6. *Ibid.*, 112.

7. Candace White, Danijela Radic, "Comparative Public Diplomacy: Message Strategies of Countries in Translation." *Public Relations Review* 3, no. 40 (2014): 460. URL <<http://0www.sciencedirect.com/opac.sfsu.edu/science/article/pii/S0363811114000289>>

8. *Ibid.*

9. White, Radic, "Comparative Public Diplomacy," 465.

10. *Ibid.*, 549.

11. *Ibid.*

what information to include in an article.¹² Media frames to help the public understand a concept or situation by applying meaning to an event or series of actions.¹³ According to Scheufele in the 1980's we entered the media age of "social constructivism" where mass media has the ability to construct reality but at the same time is limited by the communication between news and recipients.¹⁴ Media framing constantly faces criticism for lack of total objectivity but motives can be intentional or unconscious.¹⁵ Therefore, the editors are actors in achieving soft power as they help determine what people should pay attention too.¹⁶

In order to understand the influential capabilities of soft power and utilization of the media, we must look at a state with virtually no hard powers, but who has vast influence globally: The Vatican. Mariano Barbato analyzes the overlooked power of the Vatican in his article *A State, a Diplomat, and a Transnational Church: The Multi-layered Actorness of the Holy See*. Barbato looks at three levels of the Holy See: first territory itself gives the Vatican global recognition, secondly, the Pope as a leader of a global church with membership over one billion people, and lastly the Holy See as an observer state in the United Nations and a global participant in international relations.¹⁷ The Holy See presents a unique case because of the driving Catholic doctrine that hovers behind decisions of the state, but it also allows the Vatican to reach more people due to its "preparedness to accept competing solidarist views and pluralistic societies of states and beliefs".¹⁸ In order to analyze the capability of influence we must not only look at the Church or the territory, but the role and personality of the Pope himself. After the resignation of Pope Benedict XVII, the cardinals elected the first non-European pope in over four hundred years, Pope Francis from Argentina. Roland Flamini analyzes the instantaneous popularity of Francis in his article *Pope Francis: Resurrecting Catholicism's Image?*. Entering on the platform to bring concern and awareness of poverty, Pope Francis refused the papal residency, the traditional

12. *Ibid.*, 100.

13. D. Scheufele, "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," *Journal of Communication* 1, no. 49 (1999): 104

14. *Ibid.*, 105.

15. *Ibid.*, 106.

16. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," 100.

17. Mariano Barbato, "A State, a Diplomat, and a Transnational Church: The Multilayered Actorness of the Holy See," *Perspectives Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 21 (2013): 33.

18. *Ibid.*, 37.

papal shoes, and often dines with hotel dining guests.¹⁹ A pope dedicated to creating a close relationship with the people, he has drawn vast attention from the media and has widely been labeled “The People’s Pope.” By looking at the pope as a public diplomat and the media’s portrayal of his symbolic actions, we can determine whether the pope is left leaning or if image portrayal is the extent of his progressiveness.

Methodology

Time Magazine is one of America’s oldest magazines starting in 1923, and one of the highest circulating weekly magazine publications with over 3 million subscriptions in 2012.²⁰ This paper will analyze the printed articles on Pope Francis in the weekly editions from the time of his appointment through May 2014. In those thirteen months, Time has written six exclusive articles about him, including featuring him on the cover three times and naming him “Person of the Year” for 2013.

In order to understand Time’s framing of Pope Francis during his first year, this paper will analyze a number of different elements. First, this paper will analyze the themes of the articles that reoccur and cycle in the magazine over the year. Themes will bring to light what agendas the mainstream media decides to perpetuate and recirculate to the public and how they frame the topics. By readdressing certain issues or public appearances, the publication reintroduces the subject into public debate and conversation. Secondly, articles will be coded for repetitive and subjective rhetoric in order to understand what key words and phrases the media has chosen to associate with each theme. Analyzing rhetoric can lead to learning how Time interprets Pope Francis’ diplomacy and if they frame him as progressive and left leaning. In addition, the rhetoric used and quotes chosen will disclose whether the media grants Pope Francis the ability to guide the Vatican’s foreign policy

19. Roland Flamini, “Pope Francis,” *World Affairs* 176, no. 3 (2013): 26, URL <[http://0-search.ebscohost.com.opac.sfsu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=a9h&AN=89861176&site=ehost-live](http://0-search.ebscohost.com/opac.sfsu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=a9h&AN=89861176&site=ehost-live)>.

20. Jane Sasseen, Katerina-Eva Matsa, Amy Mitchell, “News Magazines: By the Numbers State of the Media,” *News Magazines: By the Numbers | State of the Media* (2013). URL <<http://stateofthedia.org/2013/news-magazines-embracing-their-digital-future/news-magazines-by-the-numbers/>>.

A Pope for the New World

Two weeks after Jorge Mario Bergoglio changed his name to Pope Francis, he appeared on the cover of Time magazine with the title “New World Pope”. Following the self-resignation of Pope Benedict the XVI, the first since the 12th century, the next Pope was destined to capture the media’s attention, but the Vatican shocked the media by electing an Argentinean, giving a voice to the Southern Hemisphere. Time immediately established Francis’ popularity in the debut cover story with the article lead, “Habeus Papam Francis came the tweet, the first official word from the @Pontifex account”.²¹

By focusing on his social media presence as the first aspect of his papacy, the magazine established the Pope as one who will be constantly watched, talked about, and paid attention to. In addition to mentioning his twitter account, in the same sentence, author Howard Chua-Eoan states his papal appointment was “watched millions and millions on every imaginable 21st century technology around the world”.²² Twice in the first sentence of his initial publicity is his accessibility and popularity emphasized by media technology and therefore subtly stating a potential influence of change not only among Catholics but also worldwide. In addition, the publication established media as his main tool to reach and communicate with the world.

Throughout the six major articles about the new Pope, Time focused on two major topics discussed by Francis: helping the poor and global economic inequality. In addition, Time perpetually emphasized Francis’ humble personality, defining him as one of the people, and therefore instituting his potential to initiate change. By taking the name from Saint Francis of Assisi, Pope Francis coined the theme of his papacy to help those in poverty, but it was the media who created the term “Pope for the poor”. Within the six articles, the words “poor” and “poverty” appear over twenty six times, which

19. Ibid

20. Jane Sasseen, Katerina-Eva Matsa, Amy Mitchell, “News Magazines: By the Numbers State of the Media,” News Magazines: By the Numbers | State of the Media (2013). URL <<http://stateofthedia.org/2013/news-magazines-embracing-their-digital-future/news-magazines-by-the-numbers/>>.

21. Howard Chua-Eoan, “A Pope of the Americas,” Time Magazine, last modified March 13, 2013, <<http://world.time.com/2013/03/13/pope-of-the-americas/>>.

22. Ibid.

emphasizes the media's focus on the Pope who's from the southern hemisphere wanting to aid those in extreme poverty who predominantly live in the same region of the world. It is not his intelligence or experience in theology that has captivated the media, but his far from luxurious upbringing and simplistic lifestyle.

In his second cover story, a mere four months after his appointment, titled "A Pope for the Poor," the article states that Francis could be a "Pope for everyone." Francis gained the popularity of evangelicals "as a Pontiff they can deal with" and atheists after he stated some of them could merit heaven, shocking conservatives and stirring up progressive suspicions. In fact, the preceding statements were found in the same paragraph showing the magazine correlates a Pope for the poor as also having the potential to be a Pope for everyone.²³ Defining Francis, as a Pope for everyone is a strong claim based on the ideal that because of his different perspective, he could catalyze change, which is where the Vatican gains all of its soft power. Framing Francis as putting "fresh face on the ancient papacy" and claiming he will "deliver much-needed oxygen to parts of the Catholic doctrine" has kept all eyes on the Vatican including evangelicals, atheists, and homosexuals.

In addition to drawing attention to the poor, Francis has gone further by advocating against the current global economic structure by visiting third world countries and speaking against materialism and greed.²⁴ Economic equality is a progressive ideal but only through statements, and not actions, has he voiced this opinion. The article did point out Francis' decision to tackle the scandal around the Vatican's banking system, the Institute for Works of Religion (IOR), by having the IOR focus on greater transparency and emphasizing a need to follow accounting rules and regulations.²⁵ It is not the actions themselves that cause the media to frame him as a progressive, but instead the continual correlation that his desire for economic equality stems from his background and region of origin. He has been pressured, just like the previous Pope's, to tackle the sex scandals, corruption allegations, and stance on homosexuality and abortion. Although he took steps to regulate the Vatican's bank, he stated the church has become too focused on the issues of abortion, homosexuality, and

23. Howard Chua-Eoan, "A Pope for the Poor," *Time Magazine*, last modified July 29, 2013, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2147719,00.html>

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

contraception.²⁶

Nye would define this decision as “attractive power” because by avoiding the wounds of the past, he has shifted the world’s focus away from negative events caused by a certain number of people to combating poverty by encouraging compassion and participation from everyone. He has divided the world, not by faith, political beliefs, geography, or socioeconomic class, but simply by those who need help and those who can provide it. It is through this advocacy diplomacy that Francis has gained the media and public’s attention, backing White and Radic’s claim that advocacy diplomacy may be the most influential.

Next, we must look at how the media portrays the Pope’s personality and image to the public. Throughout the printed articles, Time mentioned his choice to wear black shoes four different times (opposed to the traditional red), his choice not to stay in the papal residence seven times, his experience riding the bus five times, and even mentioned the denial of the Vatican that Francis occasionally dresses casually to sneak out and give alms.²⁷ The media portrays him as one of humility and having the ability to relate to those of lower socioeconomic class, establishing him as someone expected to initiate dramatic change despite his representation of the Holy See and Catholic doctrine. In fact, throughout the articles, there was anticipation of change or claim change had occurred over ten times but statements that he has not disagreed with the Catholic doctrine only four. Although not a significant gap, it does show the media favoring a more “liberal” Pope. Even more interesting, in rhetoric stating an anticipation or claim of change, Francis is given sole responsibility but any resistance to change is due to the Church, Catholic teachings, or history of the Vatican. For instance, in the article “A People’s Pope” the authors pulled a quote from an interview where he was asked about more controversial topics and he stated “The teaching of the church...is clear and I am a son of the church but it is not necessary to talk about those...issues all the time.”²⁸ The media has therefore framed Francis as being progressive and having his ideals hindered by the institution he represents but he has avoided stating his personal views

26. Mary Eberstadt, “The Pope is No Radical,” Time Magazine, last modified October 7, 2013. <<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2153109-2,00.html>>.

27. Howard Chua-Eoan, Elizabeth Dias, “Pope of the Americas,” Time Magazine, last modified December 11, 2013. <http://poy.time.com/2013/12/11/person-of-the-year-pope-francis-the-peoples-pope/>

choosing to keep the Church open to all. Although he may be hindered from stating personal beliefs, whether conservative or liberal, his personality plays a significant part in the foreign policy decisions of the Vatican.

In fact, his personality has influenced many of the Vatican's foreign policy decisions. At the beginning of the year Francis named 19 new cardinals – the majority being from small towns in Latin America, Asia and Africa.²⁹ In addition, he specifically picked cardinals for their pastoral experience rather than popularity or hierarchy. Not only did Francis steer away from appointing Italians, but also instead of having the Vatican inform the Cardinals of their appointment, many of them were informed of their appointments by TV broadcast.³⁰ This change in style shows Francis utilizing the media as the Vatican's public relations by having them pay attention to the diversity of cardinal picks instead of publicly addressing previous sex scandals.³¹ In addition, Francis has mastered Nye's "paradox of plenty" concept by knowing how to steer the media to focus on what he wants.³²

His active diplomatic efforts in a style far different from previous Popes, has gained the Vatican an immeasurable amount of soft power. Gracing three covers of the most notorious and respected magazine in the first year of his papacy, Francis has intrigued the world with his style of leadership, the mere definition of soft power.³³ In addition he has mastered the ability to use the media as the Holy See's public relations platform, strengthening his public diplomacy efforts and widening his influence.³⁴ The media, in turn, has vehemently responded to Francis, framing him as having numerous potential to initiate change, but to what extent, no one knows.

It is important to note that a comparative study with the Vatican's news source or using a sample size including images or other sources could provide more conclusive results. In addition, with Francis' papacy barely entering into its second year, the clear direction of his papacy and accomplishments are widely

28. Chua-Eoan, "A People's Pope."

29. Howard Chua-Eoan, "Pope Picks Cardinals Fit for New Church," *Time Magazine*, last modified January 16, 2014. <<http://time.com/912/pope-picks-cardinals-fit-for-new-church/>>.

30. *Ibid.*

31. White, Radic, "Comparative Public Diplomacy," 459.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, 95.

34. *Ibid.*

unclear.

Conclusion

In the last year the Vatican, a state with virtually no hard powers, has captivated the media through one man, Pope Francis. Gracing the cover of Time magazine three different times in his short papacy, Francis has sparked public debate and gained global popularity and recognition through a change in style and new perspective of century old traditions. He has always lived a simple lifestyle back in Argentina and refused to change after his appointment as Pope by choosing the Vatican guesthouse opposed the traditional papal residency. His simplistic choices sparked media attention and he has steered them since.

A public diplomat for the Holy See and the head of a Church with over a billion people, Francis' attainment of soft power in the last year has established him as a global leader. Only time will tell the extent of his influence and potential for change through his modern perspective of our current global economic situation.

Works Cited

- Barbato, Mariano. "A State, a Diplomat, and a Transnational Church: The Multi-Layered Actorness of the Holy See," *Perspectives. Review of International Affairs* 21.2 (2013): 27-48. JSTOR.
- Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25.4 (2001):107-46. <<http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/3092135>>. (Accessed June 19, 2014)
- Chua-Eoan, Howard. "A Pope for the Poor." *Time Magazine* 29 July 2013: n. pag. *Time Magazine*. Time Inc. <<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2147719-1,00.html>>. (Accessed June 30, 2014).
- Chua-Eoan, Howard. "Pope of the Americas." *Time Magazine* 25 Mar. 2013: n. pag. *Time Magazine*. Time Inc. <<http://world.time.com/2013/03/13/pope-of-the-americas/>>. (Accessed June 30, 2014).
- Chua-Eoan, Howard. "Pope Picks Cardinals Fit for New Church." *Time Magazine* 16 Jan. 2014: n. pag. *Time Magazine*. Time Inc., 16 Jan. 2014. <<http://time.com/912/pope-picks-cardinals-fit-for-new-church/>>. (Accessed June 30, 2014).
- Eberstadt, Mary. "The Pope Is No Radical." *Time Magazine* 7 Oct. 2013: n. pag. *Time Magazine*. Time Inc., 7 Oct. 2013. <<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2153109-2,00.html>>. (Accessed June 30, 2014).
- Evans, Ernest. "The Vatican's Foreign Policy after the Collapse of Soviet Communism." *World Affairs* 155.1 (1992): 27-30. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672331>>. (Accessed June 19, 2014).
- Flamini, Roland. "Pope Francis." *World Affairs* 176.3 (2013): 25-34. *Academic Search Complete*. <<http://0-search.ebscohost.com.opac.sfsu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=a9h&AN=89861176&site=ehost-live>>. (Accessed June 19, 2014).

Gross, Kimberly, and Lisa D'Ambrosio. "Framing Emotional Response." *Political Psychology* 25.1 (2004): 1-29. JSTOR. International Society of Political Psychology. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792521>>. (Accessed June 23, 2014).

Nye, Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 94-109. JSTOR. Sage Publications. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672331>>. (Accessed June 23, 2014).

Robinson, Gene. "Pope Francis' Baby Step on Gays." *Time Magazine* 12 Aug. 2013: n. pag. Time Magazine. Time Inc., 12 Aug. 2013.. <<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2148640,00.html>>. (Accessed June 30, 2014).

Sasseen, Jane, Katerina-Eva Matsa, and Amy Mitchell. "News Magazines: By the Numbers | State of the Media." *News Magazines: By the Numbers | State of the Media*. Pew Research, 2013. <<http://stateofthemedias.org/2013/news-magazines-embracing-their-digital-future/news-magazines-by-the-numbers/>>. (Accessed July 2, 2014).

Scheufele, D. "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects." *Journal of Communication* 49.1 (1999): 103-22. (Accessed June 23, 2014).

Wang, Jian. "Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited." *Public Relations Review* 32.2 (2006): 91-96. Science Direct.

White, Candace, and Danijela Radic. "Comparative Public Diplomacy: Message Strategies of Countries in Transition." *Public Relations Review* 40.3 (2014): 459-65. Science Direct. <[http://0www.sciencedirect.com.opac.sfsu.edu/science/article/pii/S0363811114000289](http://0www.sciencedirect.com/opac.sfsu.edu/science/article/pii/S0363811114000289)>. (Accessed May 20, 2014).

ABSTRACT » *This essay will attempt to answer the question, “Why have Islamist groups like Boko Haram had success in West Africa?” I will focus on Nigeria, where BH is most prevalent. In order to gain some basic knowledge about BH, the paper will begin with a background section. This section will include information on the systemic problems of Nigeria, the teachings of the group and their political platform, the leaders of the group and the prominent actors involved in combating the group, as well as some history of their attacks on the population. The paper will then provide a short literature review to show what scholars have identified as the leading causes of a powerful terrorist organization emerging in this country at this time. I will discuss why despite other prominent problems such as extreme poverty and corruption, Nigeria’s federal government could have much more control over the situation than it has shown.*

.....

Boko Haram and the Mismanagement of the Nigerian State

» by Ian Laettner

Introduction

Boko Haram (BH) has gained attention recently with reports of mass kidnappings and murders throughout Nigeria. Since BH led riots in 2009, the group has grown powerful in northeast Nigeria as well as parts of Niger, Chad, Benin, Somalia and Mauritania.¹ This power is a result of success in terrorizing northern Nigeria, gaining followers, and staying away from capture. As is the case with many issues in Africa, BH's success in wreaking havoc can be blamed on multiple causes. This paper will discuss the possible explanations for BH's emergence as a terrorist

organization attempting to answer the question, "Why has BH had success in Nigeria?"

Since its rise with the Boko Haram Riots in 2009, the group has been involved in multiple violent incidents almost every month.² The group has not discriminated as to whom it attacks, as they have carried out many attacks against both civilians and military personnel.³ Some of the main atrocities committed by the group include "the use of gunmen on motorbikes, killing police, politicians

1 Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, "The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?" *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (2012), 858.

2 "Timeline of Boko Haram attacks and related violence," IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, last modified January 20, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/94691/nigeria-timeline-of-boko-haram-attacks-and-related-violence>.

3 Farouk Chothia, "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists," BBC African Service, Last modified January 21, 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>.

and anyone who criticizes it, including clerics from other Muslim traditions and Christian preachers.”⁴ The group has also carried out multiple bombings in the last few years in places such as “churches, bus ranks, bars, military barracks and even the police and UN headquarters in the capital, Abuja.”⁵ The most recent development was the May 2013 promise-made-good by leader Abubakar Shekau to start abducting girls.⁶ Shekau took responsibility for the abduction of 276 girls from a girl’s school in Borno State in April, 2014: “‘I abducted your girls,’ a man claiming to be Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau said in a video first obtained by Agence France-Presse... ‘There is a market for selling humans. Allah says I should sell. He commands me to sell.’”⁷ The newest development has finally warranted some international support of the Nigerian government with the U.S., U.K., France, China and Israel sending teams to help with the crisis. Unfortunately for Nigeria, this support is most likely limited to the immediate problem.⁸

Despite BH just now becoming a universally known group, scholars have been writing about the group since its inception. The main literature on the group revolves around what has allowed them to emerge as such a successful organization at terrorizing West Africa. The emergence has been blamed on systemic problems such as extreme poverty, lack of education, unequal distribution of wealth, corruption, and governmental mismanagement.⁹

In order to gain some basic knowledge about BH, the paper will begin with a background section. This section will include information on the systemic problems of Nigeria, the teachings of the group and their political platform, the leaders of the group and the prominent actors involved in combating the group, as well as some history of their attacks on the population. The paper will then provide a short literature review to show what scholars have identified as the leading causes of a powerful terrorist organization emerging in this country at this time. Once we have established an array of ideas about BH’s rise, I will show why, despite other prominent problems such as extreme poverty and cor-

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Saeed Ahmed, “Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau: A ruthless leader with a twisted ideology,” CNN World, last modified May 7, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/07/world/africa/abubakar-shekau-profile/>.

7 Aminu Abubakar, “‘I will sell them,’ Boko Haram Leader Says of Kidnapped Nigerian Girls.” CNN World, last modified May 6, 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/>.

8 Andrew Walker, “Why Nigeria Has Defeated Boko Haram,” BBC African Service, last modified May 14, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27396702>.

9 Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, “The Boko Haram Uprising...”, 854.

ruption, Nigeria's federal government could have much more control over the situation than it has shown.

Background

In order to better understand what makes BH successful, we must look at the problems of the country in which the group has been most prevalent, Nigeria. Following the abolition of the slave trade, Nigeria was colonized by Britain from 1861 until Nigerian independence on October 1, 1960.¹⁰ Nigeria is now Africa's most populous country with 177,155,754 people as well as the largest economy in Africa with a GDP of US\$502 billion, mainly due to its oil resources.¹¹ Nigeria lays claim to four billionaires, including the richest black man in the world.¹² Despite this large GDP, Nigeria is 180th in the world in GDP per capita and 177th in the world with a 23.9% unemployment rate.¹³ The country has more than 250 ethnic groups, the largest groups are "Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%."¹⁴ About 50% of the country is Christian, 40% Muslim, and 10% of the population follow indigenous religions.¹⁵ The literacy rate is about 61% of the population.¹⁶ All of these problems and more lead Nigeria to a 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) rating of just .459, which ranks 158 of 187 countries listed.¹⁷ Corruption is difficult to measure, but Transparency International ranked Nigeria 144 of 177 countries in perceived corruption with a score of 25 out of 100 (100 signifying no corruption).¹⁸

Now that we have some historic, demographic, and economic context, we can look more closely at the group itself. While the translation of 'Boko Haram' is contested, the name is typically translated as 'western education is sinful'.¹⁹ However, Paul Newman, a Hausa scholar writes, "'Boko' has a vari-

10 "A Country Study: Nigeria," The Library of Congress, *Country Studies*. Last Modified March 29, 2011, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html>.

11 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Nigeria," Last Updated April 23, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>

12 "The World's Billionaires: #24 Aliko Dangote." Forbes, Last Modified May 14, 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/>.

13 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Nigeria."

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013," Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption. Last modified 2013, <http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA>.

18 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013." Transparency International.

19 Abimbola Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State," *Africa Today* 57, no. 4 (2011): 98-119.

ety of meanings focused around denoting ‘things or actions having to do with fraudulence, sham, or inauthenticity’ or deception.”²⁰ Regardless of how the name is translated, the ideals of the group include the destruction of democracy and western education.²¹ “Although the group’s name is widely translated as ‘Western education is forbidden/sinful,’ Boko Haram’s leaders insist that the name refers not just to Western education but also to Western civilization in its entirety.”²² Atane Ofajaja tells us that this resentment toward western civilization is left over from British colonization and disproportionate attention given to the northern and southern regions of the country.²³

Preaching these anti-western sentiments popular in the north, Mohammed Yusuf founded BH in 2002.²⁴ Yusuf was a preacher and former Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood member in the 1980s, which they call the Yan Brothers in Hausa.²⁵ In a lecture in Yobe, Nigeria, he laid out the reason why western education is a problem:

“The intent behind this is education within schools which have been established by missionaries which includes the education curriculum from elementary education to secondary schooling and institutes to national service to employment.”²⁶

He believed that Western civilization was infecting all forms of life in Nigeria, and Islamic teachings and laws were the solution to this problem. Yusuf’s rejection of Nigeria’s secular system led him to turn “against the Nigerian state and criticize the arbitrariness of Nigerian institutions –in particular,

20 Dan Murphy, “‘Boko Haram’ Doesn’t Really Mean ‘Western Education Is a Sin,’” Security Watch, Last modified May 6, 2014, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2014/0506/Boko-Haram-doesn-t-really-mean-Western-education-is-a-sin>.

21 Ibid.

22 “Boko Haram: The Emerging Jihadist Threat in West Africa.” ADL: Anti-Defamation League, Last modified December 12, 2011, <http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/boko-haram-jihadist-threat-africa.html>.

23 Atane Ofajaja, “To Understand Boko Haram, The West Must Look More Closely at Itself Than At Nigeria,” Policy Mic, Last modified May 13, 2014. <http://www.policymic.com/articles/89247/to-understand-boko-haram-the-west-must-look-more-closely-at-itself-than-at-nigeria>.

24 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “Timeline of Boko Haram attacks and Related Violence.”

25 Ahmad Murtada, *Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities*. Translated by ‘AbdulHaq Al-Ashanti. (Vol. 12 of *Al-Qira’at, Rabi’ al-Akhir- Jumada al-Akhira*. www.salafimanhaj.com, 2012). PDF e-book, 5.

26 Ibid, 4.

the police and security forces.”²⁷ As we can see from his quote, this bottomless hatred for all things Western was initially sparked by the colonization of Nigeria by British missionaries.²⁸

Between 2002 and 2009, BH carried out some minor attacks, but mostly focused on recruiting and finding resources.²⁹ The true rise of BH came with riots in 2009 after a series of police raids of BH camps.³⁰ These riots left 900-1100 dead, mostly BH sect members. One of those who died in the riots was Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed at the police station after being arrested.³¹ After his death, Yusuf’s body was shown on Nigerian television as a declaration of victory over the group. However, the group’s new leader, Abubakar Shekau, stepped up in 2009.³²

Literature Review

In the opinion of Aghedo and Osumah, BH is “a consequence of governance failure and institutional fragility.”³³ Nigeria’s repressive state security approach to BH is not working. Rather, the state should adopt a human security approach.³⁴ The authors differentiate between the two types of security, which have often been grouped together as ‘national security’.

“While state security is analogous to the dominant notion of national security, human security, on the other hand, emphasizes the preservation of the well-being of persons, including the protection of their socioeconomic, political and environmental rights.”³⁵

This idea is widely agreed upon in the literature about Nigeria. According to these writers, a bottom-up approach is the only way to solve the problems of terrorism long term. With so much money generated from oil production, Nigeria’s criminal and economic problems are blamed on leadership, “The leadership since independence has essentially been corrupt, wasteful and insensitive to the genuine needs and aspirations of the populace, despite immense human and nat-

27 Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria,” *Africa Spectrum* 47, no. 2/3 (2012), 149

28 Atane Ofiaja, “To Understand Boko Haram...,” 2014.

29 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and Related Violence.”

30 Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development...,” 150.

31 *Ibid.*, 150.

32 Farouk Chothia, “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?”

33 Aghedo and Osumah. “The Boko Haram Uprising...,” 853.

34 *Ibid.*, 853.

35 *Ibid.*, 855.

ural resources.”³⁶ Because most of BH’s members are from low socio-economic backgrounds, we can infer that the desperation of individuals can largely answer how the group gained over 40,000 followers.³⁷

Abimbola Adesoji claims that the problem has not only been caused by the recent government’s inefficiency, but by decades of incompetence. “Beyond the usual approach of brutally suppressing insurgence and constituting tribunal or commission of inquiry, government has not taken concrete steps toward addressing the problem.”³⁸ He cites the case of 923 Maitatsine members (another Nigerian Islamist group) pardoned in October 1982 as an example of the state refusing to take responsibility in fear of negligence.³⁹ He criticizes the Nigerian state for its 1999 attempt to appease the fundamentalists by allowing Sharia law implemented in 12 of the 19 northern states.⁴⁰

“The inability or reluctance to tackle Sharia operators and checkmate the fanatical sects and armed gangs could be evidence of political patronage, political laxity and rivalries, or a combination of both. The patronage of religion by the political elite could explain the situation where the elite in government vacillate in making decisions or are indecisive on issues that require prompt action.”⁴¹

Adesoji says that police are often wrongfully blamed for this ineptitude, but the blame should really fall on the state for refusing to “arm them adequately and motivate them for better performance.”⁴² He believes that the best way to become more proactive in the removal of fundamentalist groups prone to violence is to enlist Islamic leaders from the north to help “in the process of identification, categorization, monitoring, to prevent jaundiced and politically motivated teaching from spreading.”⁴³ After addressing the identification of these groups, the state must stop allowing religious patronage to run the country, the state must hold strong as a secular entity.⁴⁴

36 Aghedo and Osumah. “The Boko Haram Uprising...,” 861.

37 Ibid., 861.

38 Abimbola Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram,” 110.

39 Ibid., 111.

40 Ibid., 110.

41 Ibid., 113.

42 Ibid., 114.

43 Ibid., 115.

44 Ibid., 115.

Roman Loimeier is of the same opinion that militant movements like BH's will continue to occur if changes aren't made.⁴⁵ He blames Nigeria's "inability to sustain economic growth as well as some degree of social justice."⁴⁶ On a similar economic perspective, London Christina Katsouris argued in 2004 that the United States' lack of follow through on its energy policy is at least partially to blame for problems in Africa.

"Its energy policy calls for promoting diversity of supply and promoting stability. This involves tackling the root causes of tension and mismanagement – corruption, bad governance and limited capacity to hold governments to account – through technical assistance, political pressure and dialogue with producer governments."⁴⁷

While this policy sounds good, the actions provided by the U.S. are inconsistent with its policy. Focus on the 'War on Terror' in other parts of the world has caused the U.S. to neglect West Africa.⁴⁸ Although northern Nigeria has long shown obvious signs of the reemergence of Islamic militants, "[t]here are no Western consulates and very little intelligence, very little information on what's going on."⁴⁹

Campaigning for pacifism, Agbiboa and Maiangwa call on Nigeria to create a 'non-killing' society, or at least a society in which purposeful killings are an anomaly.⁵⁰ They claim that this seemingly utopian idea of a society for Nigeria is closer than one may think.

"...the Nigerian government will have to attend to the following issues: promote a culture of religious tolerance; address issues of underdevelopment and extremism in northern Nigeria; and control its porous borders against the influx of small arms and terrorists."⁵¹

Because Christianity and Islam are peaceful in nature, the authors claim that by encouraging and publicizing religious success rather than shunning it,

45 Roman Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The Development..." 152.

46 Ibid., 152.

47 London Christina Katsouris, "Africa: Washington Neglects Oil Producers," *Energy Compass*. 1. (2004) <http://0-search.proquest.com.opac.sfsu.edu/docview/199497197?accountid=13802>.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Daniel Agbiboa and Benjamin Maiangwa, "Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-Killing Approach," *Journal of Developing Societies*. 29, no.4 (2013): 392.

51 Ibid., 394.

people will stop believing that killing is inevitable.⁵² Utilizing religious leaders to proclaim the wrongs of BH would be a useful tool to the Nigerian state, and an attempt to change the culture of killing.⁵³

Analysis

It is worth noting that all of the literature listed argues that the state has some control over the success of BH. Governmental problems are the best explanation for the group's ability to have so much success in terrorizing the population. Clearly, BH has been able to rise at this point in time in large part as a result of decades of mismanagement of government. We can easily deduce that the main problems of Nigeria (poverty, employment, health, corruption, terrorism) are interrelated. Poverty, employment and health problems are solvable with some improved leadership to crack down on corruption and to fund education and health care. As these other three problems are acknowledged and reduced, the state can address BH effectively.

Aghedo and Osumah show that the people of Nigeria agree that the state must take the lead on these problems. When asked how the Nigerian state should respond to BH violent operations, 90% of respondents to the authors' survey agreed that poverty alleviation was needed and 88% agreed that employment generation was needed. These statistics compare to just 38% agreeing that amnesty would be effective, and 46% agreeing that dialogue would help.⁵⁴ President Goodluck Jonathan's most recent approval rating was just 49%, with "very poor" rankings in security, power (utilities), and job creation.⁵⁵ The answers that emerge as the most prudent are those with long-term solutions rather than immediate action. Because this analysis focuses on how to stop future uprisings and reduce BH's power, attempting to solve the current crisis would not lead us to a long-term solution.

The mix of oil wealth and high levels of corruption has contributed greatly to the high levels of poverty.

"Petroleum has long become the most important aspect of the national economy, accounting for more than half of GDP, about 85 percent of government revenues, and over 90 percent of exports."⁵⁶

52 Ibid., 394-395.

53 Ibid., 396

54 Aghedo and Osumah. "The Boko Haram Uprising...." 864.

55 "NOI Polls Monthly: Jonathan Job Approval." News release. May 7, 2014.

56 Alex Gboyega, Tina Soreide, Tuan Minh Le, and G P Shukla. 2011. Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria. *The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 5779*: (2011), 7.

“Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has remained almost unchanged (still below US\$1,200) and there are few signs of multiplier effects from the oil industry. For the majority of the population, few, if any, benefits from the oil industry have been realized.”⁵⁶

Although there have been recent measures to improve transparency of where oil money is being spent, the federal government maintains complete control over oil resources in the country.⁵⁷ The government has thus far been unable to get oil money to its populace. This inability is due to high levels of corruption, stealing or bunkering, and unwise spending.⁵⁸ Because the Niger Delta, where most of the oil is extracted, is in the southern region of the country, oil money has even less chance of making it to the northern part of the country, causing further poverty.⁵⁹

This divide between north and south really started with the colonization of the country. A strong argument can be made that British colonization is the reason why anti-western preachers from BH and similar groups throughout history have gained followers in the north.⁶⁰

“In the South, the British built schools, roads and infrastructure, none of which appeared in the North, or at least not to the same extent. In turn, southern Nigerians were more accepting of western education, which Boko Haram so vehemently rejects.”⁶¹

Britain was able to convert most of the southern half of the country to Christianity, but the north has been ostracized for remaining Muslim. The south has continued to reap natural resource benefits while 80% of the north remains in poverty.⁶² While BH’s violent methods are not condonable, the north’s resentment can be understood.

Although BH has preached an extreme version of what much of the north believes, the group has been bit mysterious in its rise. There is disputed information behind how BH has been able to rise so quickly.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Atane Ofajaja, “To Understand Boko Haram...,” 2014.

60 Ibid.


61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

“Boko Haram seemingly adapts and adjusts effortlessly to Nigerian efforts to suppress it. Since 2009, more sophisticated tactics, as well as weaponry, has assisted Boko Haram in its ability to acclimate so quickly.”⁶³

There is much speculation about where the funding is coming from to enable the group to make these improvements. Unfortunately for the Nigerian government, the group is believed to have diversified its fundraising very impressively. As we can see from Table 1, it is believed that the group receives funding internationally, regionally, and locally.

Table 1



64

The question remains, “why has the group risen so quickly now, and not ten years ago?” This question can be answered with the change of leadership from Mohammed Yusuf to Abubakar Shekau.⁶⁵ While Yusuf was in power, the group was virtually a cult in the north of Nigeria that preached Salafi principles and

63 “Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora’s Box - the Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram,” TRAC: Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, accessed May 15, 2014, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/boko-haram%E2%80%99s-funding-operations>.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

mimicked the societal style of the Taliban, earning them the nickname, “Nigerian Taliban.”⁶⁶ Shekau is much more violent and radical than the preacher Yusuf.⁶⁷

“Shekau tied Boko Haram to the international jihadi movement in his statements by adopting anti-American rhetoric and showing support for jihadists in Algeria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq.”⁶⁸

Because we have seen that oil money is not being distributed to the rest of the country, the group’s ability to steal the oil is a major advantage.⁶⁹

The group has also been able to kidnap and recruit children in order to increase its ranks.⁷⁰ One of the reasons the group is so effective in its recruitment is that Nigerian soldiers and security forces are often times just as cruel as BH members.⁷¹ Public executions by soldiers and people disappearing after being detained by security forces make it difficult to blame northerners for their deep-seated distrust of the government.⁷² There appears to be no regulation on Nigerian soldiers, leading them to an abysmal human rights record.⁷³ This record has even led Britain to avoid helping Nigerian soldiers with training or funding.⁷⁴

Table 2 is evidence that increased military presence after President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in northeastern Nigeria has been ineffective in slowing down BH. It seems that in an effort to avoid responsibility, the government has not held soldiers accountable for their actions.⁷⁵ The government has gone as far as rejecting the idea that there is a problem, and has given soldiers extra incentives to proceed as usual: “In a bid to improve morale...soldiers’ salaries would be paid to their families after their death for longer than currently allowed.”⁷⁶ In order to solve the problem of a corrupt military, the Nigerian government has to follow the cliché of first admitting that it has a problem.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Gboyega et al., “Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria,” 2011.

70 Sarah Margon, “How Do You Beat Boko Haram With an Army That’s Almost as Evil?” *Politico Magazine*, Last modified May 13, 2014, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/obama-should-be-cautious-about-nigerias-military-106625.html#U3UmBq1dWKw>.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.


73 Andrew Walker, “Why Nigeria Has Not Defeated Boko Haram,” 2014.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

Reported civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 - Apr 2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

Table 2 76

Adeshina Afolayan, who writes that he has resorted to dealing with such terrible leadership through laughter, makes a good case for why the Nigerian state is to blame for BH's rise.⁷⁷ To show the extent of state problems, he uses lyrics from "Shuffering and Shmiling" by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, a famous Afro beat musician:

Every day my people dey inside bus
 [My people commutes daily in the bus]
 Every day my people dey inside bus
 Forty-nine sitting, ninety-nine standing
 Them go pack themselves in like sardine
 [They pack themselves tight like canned sardines]
 Them dey faint, them dey wake like cock
 [They faint and daily wake up like cock]
 Them go reach house, water no dey
 [When they get home, there isn't water]
 Them go reach bed, power no dey
 [When they get ready for bed, there is no electricity]
 Them go reach road, go-slow go come
 [When they get on the road, there is unceasing traffic jam]
 Them go reach road, police go slap
 [When they get on the road, there is policy brutality]
 Them go reach road, army go whip
 [When they get on the road, there is army brutality]
 Them go look pocket, money no dey
 [When they check their pocket, it lacks purchasing power]
 Them go reach work, query ready
 [When they eventually get to work, summons and queries are waiting]⁷⁸

Most of these problems listed are indeed problems that could be solved with improvements in state management. As mentioned earlier in the background section, Nigeria does not have a problem with overall money, it has a problem with distribution of wealth. Distribution of wealth and corruption are interrelated. The inequality of wealth can lead to heightened corruption, and "corruption tends to preserve or even widen inequalities in the distribution of income."⁷⁹ Education can be another variable that is connected to income distribution, and is clearly connected to BH's ability to sway youth into joining their cause.⁸⁰ According to Aghedo and Osumah, most of BH's members are "uneducated, school drop-

77 Adeshina Afolayan, "Hilarity and the Nigerian Condition," *Journal of Pan African Studies* 6, no. 5 (2013): 156-174.

78 *Ibid.*, 156-157.

79 Bryan W. Husted, "Wealth, Culture, and Corruption," *Journal of International Business Studies* 30, no. 2. (1999): 342.

80 Francisco H.G. Ferreira, "Education for the Masses? The Interaction Between Wealth, Educational and Political Inequalities," *Economics of Transition* 9, no. 2 (2001): 533.

outs, jobless youth, political thugs and students from low socio-economic backgrounds.”⁸¹

“Educational inequality may persist in a steady state if...the voting equilibrium fails to generate levels of public expenditure which are sufficient to increase the quality of the public schools attended by the poor.”⁸²

Education inequality is an endless cycle because a voting populace who has not been educated will be less likely to believe that education is the key to improving conditions. The state must take the lead on education issues by starting dialogue about how the nation must improve its literacy rates, currently standing at just 61%.⁸³ One step in the right direction is the free Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act of 2004, which attempts “to fight illiteracy and extend basic education opportunities to all children in the country.”⁸⁴ From the U.S. State Department’s profile of Nigerian education:

“The Federal Government of Nigeria regards education as an instrument for effecting national development. Her philosophy on education is based on the development of the individual into a sound and effective citizen and the provision of equal educational opportunities for all citizens of the nation at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels both inside and outside the formal school system.”⁸⁵

This diplomatic type of dialogue can be found all over the internet, but looking at Nigeria’s official government website, there is no information under the “Issues: Education” section.⁸⁶ This omission could be a simple oversight, but it could also be an indication of the government’s incompetence or lack of caring about its promises. The challenges of implementing the UBE Act are abundant, but implementation is still possible with correct governmental action.⁸⁷ One of these challenges is from high dropout rates. Like the other problems of Nigeria, educational problems stem from overpopulation, with 45% of the population 15 years or younger.⁸⁸ There is currently not an effective policy in place to deter chil-

81 Aghedo and Osumah. “The Boko Haram Uprising...,” 861.

82 Francisco Ferreira, “Education for the Masses?,” 549.

83 Central Intelligence Agency. (2008). *The World Factbook: Nigeria*.

84 *Ibid*.

85 U.S. State Department, *Nigeria - Education Profile, Doc.* (2014).

86 “Issues: Education.” The Federal Republic of Nigeria. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-08-21/education/193-education>.

87 S.O. Labo-Popoola, A.A. Bello, and F.A. Atanda, “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Challenges and Way Forward.” *Medwell Journals* 4, no. 6 (2009): 636-43.

88 UNICEF, “Nigeria: Education,” http://www.unicef.org/nigeria/children_1937.html.

dren from dropping out. Arresting children outside of school during school hours and holding their parents accountable would be one step in the right direction.⁸⁹ This action may be seen as cruel at first, but it would be a quick way to show the people that the acts of government are serious.

We can see that management problems have been a tradition throughout Nigerian history. The Nigerian government picked up right where the British colonists left off with vast inequality of attention given to the north and south. Issues of income inequality and educational inequality are good reasons for the north to resent the federal government, which was established by western civilization. An environment of mass resentment is a breeding ground for extremist ideas. Implementation of Sharia law and BH's current tactics are barbaric and inhumane, but Yusuf's initial teachings and resentment must be viewed as logical based on the situation in which the Nigerian government has put the north. The problems with BH do not come down to the spread of Islamism. Islam is but a tool to guide the group to their overall goal to remove all western influence in the country.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to magnify the Nigerian government's heavy influence on the rise of BH. Data provided has proven that the Nigerian government has placed extremism in an environment to thrive for decades. More research is needed to give further advice to improve the Nigerian government, but we can start with some logical ideas.

International funding from organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab is very difficult to suppress, but the state can be blamed for much of BH's other sources of funding, as well as many of the systemic problems in the country that have enabled the group to recruit. If the government is going to have a chance to quell the BH uprising, it must first improve its ability to spread money earned from natural resources, especially to the north. This distribution of wealth would decrease poverty, as well as improve corruption rates and education. Since 1999, when democracy was put into force, the country has improved in some areas, but not nearly enough. Legislation such as the UBE Act to improve education and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to audit the oil industry are steps in the right direction, but are still far too weakly enforced.⁹⁰ To improve on this, the government must resist the pull of southern money. Passing laws to ensure equal funding to all parts of the country would be a very big step

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Gboyega et al., "Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria," 2011.

toward winning the respect of its northern citizens. Funding military tribunals and a military police force to hold soldiers accountable would also improve the opinions of the inhabitants of the north. Looking to other governments for advice and strategies to stop soldiers' abuse of civilians would be useful as well.

Unlike many other developing countries, Nigeria does not have a problem making money. Rather, Nigeria faces the problem of how to manage all of its money. Currently, hardheaded ways and the pull of money have caused such high levels of corruption that the country will not be able to fix its problems without big changes. Systemic problems are the hardest type of problems to solve, but following the advice above would be an effective first step to extracting Nigeria from the endless cycle of poverty, poor education, corruption, and extremist beliefs. BH is violating basic human rights of the Nigerian people, and it is the responsibility of the state to protect them.

Works Cited

- A Country Study: Nigeria*. From the Library of Congress. *Country Studies*. Last Modified March 29, 2011. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html>
- Abubakar, Aminu. "I will sell them,' Boko Haram leader says of kidnapped Nigerian girls." CNN World. Last modified May 6, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/>.
- Adesoji, Abimbola. 2011. Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. *Africa Today*. 57, no. 4: 98-119.
- Afolayan, Adeshina. 2013. Hilarity and the Nigerian Condition. *Journal of Pan African Studies*. 6, no. 5: 156-174.
- Agbibo, Daniel, and Benjamin Maiangwa. 2013. Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-Killing Approach. *Journal of Developing Societies*. 29, no.4: 379-403.
- Aghedo, Iro and Oarhe Osumah. 2012. The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?. *Third World Quarterly*. 33, no. 5, 853-869.
- Ahmed, Saeed. "Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau: A ruthless leader with a twisted ideology." CNN World. Last modified May 7, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/>.
- "Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora's Box - the Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram." TRAC: Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Accessed May 15, 2014. <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/boko-haram%E2%80%99s-funding-operations>.
- "Boko Haram: The Emerging Jihadist Threat in West Africa." ADL: Anti-Defamation League. Last modified December 12, 2011. Accessed May 11, 2014. <http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/boko-haram-jihadist-threat-africa.html>.
- Chothia, Farouk. (2011). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists. Available on BBC African Service (News). Available on <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501> (Accessed: 12 May, 2013).

- Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. The World Factbook: Nigeria. Updated April 23, 2014, Retrieved May 12, 2014, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>
- “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013.” Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption. Last modified 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. <http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA>.
- Ferreira, Francisco H.G. 2001. Education for the Masses? The Interaction Between Wealth, Educational and Political Inequalities. *Economics of Transition*. 9, no. 2: 533-552.
- Gboyega, Alex, Tina Soreide, Tuan Minh Le, and G P Shukla. 2011. Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria. *The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 5779*, 2011.
- Husted, Bryan W. 1999. Wealth, Culture, and Corruption. *Journal of International Business Studies*. 30, no. 2: 339-359.
- “Issues: Education.” The Federal Republic of Nigeria. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-08-21/education/193-education>.
- Katsouris, London Christina. 2004. Africa: Washington Neglects Oil Producers. *Energy Compass*. 1.
- Labo-Popoola, S.O., A.A. Bello, and F.A. Atanda. “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Challenges and Way Forward.” *Medwell Journals* 4, no. 6 (2009): 636-43.
- Loimeier, Roman. 2012. Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*. 47, no. 2/3: 137-155.
- Margon, Sarah. “How Do You Beat Boko Haram with an Army That’s Almost as Evil?” *Politico Magazine*. Last modified May 13, 2014. Accessed May 15, 2014. <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/obama-should-be-cautious-about-nigerias-military-106625.html#.U3UmBq1dWKw>.
- Murphy, Dan. “‘Boko Haram’ Doesn’t Really Mean ‘Western Education Is a Sin.’” *Security Watch*. Last modified May 6, 2014. Accessed May 10, 2014. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2014/0506/Boko-Haram-doesn-t-really-mean-Western-education-is-a-sin>.

Murtada, Ahmad. "Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities." In *Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities*. Translated by 'AbdulHaq Al-Ashanti. N.p.: www.SalafiManhaj.com, 2013.

"Nigeria: Education." UNICEF. Accessed May 14, 2014. http://www.unicef.org/nigeria/children_1937.html.

"NOI Polls Monthly: Jonathan Job Approval." News release. May 7, 2014.

Ofajana, Atane. "To Understand Boko Haram, The West Must Look More Closely At Itself Than At Nigeria." Policy Mic. Last modified May 13, 2014. Accessed May 16, 2014. <http://www.policymic.com/articles/89247/to-understand-boko-haram-the-west-must-look-more-closely-at-itself-than-at-nigeria>.

"The World's Billionaires: #24 Aliko Dangote." Forbes. Last modified May 14, 2014. Accessed May 14, 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/>.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and Related Violence." IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis. Last modified January 20, 2012. Accessed May 11, 2014. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/94691/nigeria-timeline-of-boko-haram-attacks-and-related-violence>.

U.S. State Department, Nigeria - Education Profile, Doc. (2014).

Walker, Andrew. 2014. Why Nigeria Has Not Defeated Boko Haram. Available on BBC African Service (News). Available on <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27396702>. (Accessed: 15 May, 2014).

ABSTRACT » *The Ebola outbreak of 2014 began with the March 25th reporting of the first 86 suspected cases from Guinea to the World Health Organization (WHO), of which included 49 deaths. Since then the disease has spread through West Africa with the worst cases seen in history. No global leader emerged to contain the virus in its early stages, and many lives were lost. This issue calls attention to a larger form of miscommunication among a globalized world. Who is responsible to help the people affected by such a crisis? These questions will be considered through a review of theories of what factors result in aide or intervention to occur. This argument provides an opportunity to learn from mistakes and more importantly, identify concrete ways to ensure they are not repeated.*

.....

Humanitarian Aid and Intervention: The Responsibility for Action During the Ebola Epidemic

» by *Noora Larson*

A Common Humanity

Since the March 25th reporting to the World Health Organization (WHO), the disease has spread through West Africa with the worst cases seen in history.¹ This could have been caused by the Zaire strain, the deadliest of the five strains of Ebola.² The larger reason, however, was the overall absence of initial collaborative response by

international and nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and aid groups. The WHO specifically lacked the appropriate leadership role that needed to be in place to contain the virus efficiently as possible. Perhaps, those responsible at the WHO hoped a country would take the lead to battle this epidemic. However, no global leader emerged and the opportunity to contain the virus early and save many lives was lost within months. Theoretical perspectives will address a social, economic, and political aspects that determine decisions in regards to aiding those burdened with the Ebola epidemic.

- 1 "2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa", CDC, September 25, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, <http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/previous-updates.html>
- 2 "Why Ebola is so dangerous", BBC, October 8, 2014, accessed October 10, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26835233>

Tim Dunne, an International Relations expert specializing in issues concerning peace and security, asserts that in order to recognize human rights there has to be a “common humanity.” This common humanity is the essential moral worth of all humans - regardless of sovereign boundaries - that we have for fellow humans. Dunne explains, “human rights are the most obvious indicator of a move beyond a pluralist international society and its exclusive interest in the pursuit of order and the limitation of an understanding of justice that is limited to demands by sovereign states to be treated equally.”³ The move towards this society is predicted by the need to recognize the rights of every individual. The extension of international law will occur if there is a broader understanding of justice beyond sovereign states, and a larger interest in pursuing something other than order.

To explain the extension of international law, Dunne breaks down the institutional role of INGOs, by specifically addressing issues regarding human rights.⁴ In a world society, the capability to cross sovereign borders to raise a collective conscience helps promote concern from individuals worldwide. INGOs are able to actively criticize a country’s government that commits these violations. This ability to hold the government of a sovereign country responsible creates an extension of law that enables human rights interventions to take place. Dunne, following the English School theory, further explains the development of norms in which there is a fundamental common sense value of human rights.

Lack of Human Rights Acknowledgement

In the case of the Ebola epidemic, the major nongovernmental actors are the WHO, Doctors without Borders (MSF), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). They have each contributed where the local governments were unable to control the outbreak. On August 8th 2014, the WHO declared the Ebola virus as a global public health emergency, acknowledging the seriousness of the outbreak. Only thirteen days earlier, the WHO regional director visited Liberia (the affected most by Ebola), which followed standard WHO program procedure for assessment. Seeing as within a span of less than two weeks the WHO action went from a visit to one

1 Tim Dunne, “The English School”, in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne et al. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 146.

span of less than two weeks the WHO action went from a visit to one affected country, to a declaration of the West African region being an “international public health emergency,” shows that this assessment should have been done sooner.⁵

By early August, the Ebola outbreak had struck an entire region and rendered its governments incapable to respond to the increasing spread of the virus. The announcement on August 8th came more than four months into the epidemic, with the WHO officials previously dismissing greater roles from the CDC and MSF pleas for more action.⁶ The only acknowledgements of a humanitarian mission occurred earlier in mid-July, when the African Union Security Council authorized the immediate deployment of a joint AU-led military and humanitarian mission.⁷ At this point INGOs involved in the beginning events raised collective consciousness, but failed to promote concern from individuals who would be able to actively make a difference in the response. For the West Africans plagued with this disease, there was neither “common humanity” nor reference to human equality that would have brought about a large enough response to effectively deal with the issue. Due to this failure, there was no broader understanding of justice that would result in the extension of international to aid West Africans.

Justifiable Investment

However, according to Samuel Huntington, the motives behind providing foreign aid have less to do with a “common humanity”, and are more about the conscious decision of a concessional transfer of resources. Huntington posits that aid would not be given without benefiting the country providing these

2 Ibid.

5. WHO: Ebola Outbreak ‘International Public Health Emergency’”, Deutsche Welle, August 8, 2014, accessed September 27, 2014, <http://www.dw.de/who-ebola-outbreak-international-public-healthemergency/a-17840752>
6. Lena H. Sung et al., “Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations Failed to Stop the Ebola Disaster”, The Washington Post, October 4, 2014, accessed October 10, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/10/04/how-ebola-sped-out-of-control/>
7. “Peace & Security Council Report”, Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, accessed October 12, 2014, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/RAPPORTCPS/41_en~v~Rapport_sur_le_CPS_-_No_62.pdf

resources. He states, “the scope and nature of U.S. foreign aid presumably should reflect: (a) the relative importance of the ends to be served by foreign aid presumably should reflect: (a) the relative importance of the ends to be served by foreign aid in comparison with other goals; and (b) the relative effectiveness of foreign aid as a means to achieve those ends in comparison with other means.”⁸ As such, the decision to allocate foreign aid is contingent upon a country’s goals for itself and whether these are best achieved through aid or another mechanism.

In Huntington’s article, “Foreign Aid: For What and for Whom”, he specifically deals with the goals of economic development which led to the practice of foreign aid. Aid programs in the 1940’s and early 1950’s had been devoted to the recovery of Western European countries which was incredibly important to the United States, and their own political and economic growth. Looking at the trends in the 1960s, he concludes that the primary objective of aiding other poorer countries was the promotion of economic development. Huntington further concludes that this development ultimately benefitted specific U.S. industries as it created markets for U.S. manufactured products. The other rationale for the allocation of aid is the fear of the consequences if it is not offered. This brought the U.S. government to the conclusion that the lack of foreign aid would inevitably affect the nation negatively due to the negative attention and socio-political pressure.

Allocation of Aid

When Huntington refers to the allocation of aid as a concessional transfer of resources, he narrows the issue to a monetary focus rather than a moral focus, which Dunne argues. The determination of giving aid from a state is therefore focused on whether the aid provided will not only effectively address the issues at hand, but also achieve long lasting results.⁹ Covering the rationale for allocating materials or financial support for a state would ultimately be decided on whether the state feels they are using their resources wisely. The same day the WHO announced the Ebola epidemic as an international public health emergency, the organization also published its Ebola

8. Samuel Huntington, “Foreign Aid: For What and for Whom.” *Foreign Policy*, January 1, 1971. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/30/foreign_aid_for_what_and_for_whom.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

Response Roadmap.¹⁰ Although both appropriate and standard protocol, the roadmap was essentially vague and poorly addressed the Ebola epidemic. This would therefore fail to show a plan put in place that would draw a desired amount of aid, since it lacks an effective solution for the issue at hand.

From the initial reporting in March and continuing until August, very little action took place by either a country or organization. The issues that were brought to light were as simple as inadequate protective gear, unsanitary working areas, and lack of hospital supplies. People, especially in Liberia, were suffering and dying on the hospital floors because there were not enough cots available. As a visiting professor at the University of Liberia, Job Berestecky stated on August 23rd, “the management of the response in Liberia that I have been able to observe has been very disorganized and incompetent.”¹¹

In addition to this, aid workers were not only at risk of being infected, but of violence from scared villagers. On September 18th, the Guinean government spokesman reported eight bodies had been found after an attack on a medical team educating locals on the risks of Ebola.¹² These reports showed a lack of concrete leadership to put the necessary organization and a detailed plan to effectively respond to the crisis. It also shows a danger of sending medical teams to the cause, posing larger issues regarding the safety of volunteers and the instructions they are told to follow. These factors meant that any substantial aid given to this effort would not necessarily be a justifiable investment, as most efforts were disorganized and ineffective. Allocating aid would not be enough; what would be necessary is a specific group or nation taking a leadership role in Liberia and other West African nations infected with Ebola. This means more responsibility that would not satisfy national interests at home.

Determining Responsibility

Huntington’s theory on justifiable investment compliments one of the most influential leaders in international politics, Hans Morgenthau. For Morgenthau,

-
11. Rebecca Buckwalter, “Why Hasn’t Previously Successful Methods Used to Stop Ebola Working Against This New Strain?”, *Pacific Standard: The science of society*, 4 August 2014, accessed September 10 2014, <http://www.psmag.com/navigation/health-and-behavior/arent-previously-successful-attempts-stop-ebola-working-new-strain-87510/>
 12. Rukmini Callimachi, “Fear of Ebola Drives Mob to Kill Officials in Guinea”, *NY Times*, September 18, 2014, accessed September 18, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/africa/fear-of-ebola-drives-mob-to-kill-officials-in-guinea.html>

the conclusion is simple; if there is a national interest then there will be intervention or aid.¹³ So to analyze the events during the epidemic that would substantiate aid, would mean finding reasons for countries to conclude that giving aid was in their own national interests.

Analyzing United States involvement in the Ebola epidemic, particularly in Liberia, is the best way to determine how national interest was the reasoning behind the allocation of aid. On September 11th, 2014, President Sirleaf of Liberia warned President Barack Obama that without help in tackling the spread of Ebola, the country would slip back into chaos; two days later she also made a public plea to the president for American support.¹⁴ These two events inevitably drew a lot of attention on the United States. President Sirleaf stated, “Only governments like yours have the resources and assets to deploy at a pace required to arrest the spread”,¹⁵ and seeing how Liberia was a nation founded by former American slaves with a past record of the United States government as its largest donor, it was a national interest to continue such a trend of aid because of potential backlash and negative light the government would receive if it was unwilling to help during such a crisis.

When Tomas Eric Duncan became the first person in the United States to be diagnosed with Ebola on September 29th, it set forth an even more pressing reason to send in aid.¹⁶ The disease was now crossing into the public space of the American government, and therefore it was in the U.S.’s interest to stop an outbreak from occurring. President Obama named Ron Klain to oversee the administration’s Ebola response by October, and the 101st Airborne Division sent to Liberia a month earlier was issued new hazmat suits so they

13. Hans J. Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene?” *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (1967, April): 430, accessed September 23, 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23877/hans-j-morgenthau/to-intervene-or-not-to-intervene>

14. Emma Grham-Harrison, “Liberia President ask US for help in talking Ebola,” *The Guardian*, 13 of September 2014, accessed September 18, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/13/liberia-president-asks-us-help-ebola>

15. Siobhan O’Grady, “Colonial Line Drawn Again for Ebola Aid,” *Foreign Policy*, 22 of September 2014, accessed September 23, 2014, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/09/22/colonial_lines_drawn_again_for_ebola_aid

16. Dan Bates, Paul Thompson, “Schoolchildren exposed in US Ebola scare: Texas governor Rick Perry reveals fears for kids and says 18 Americans may have virus after hospital sent infected man home”, *Daily Mail*, October 1, 2014, accessed October 22, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2775608/CDC-confirms-Dallas-patient-isolation-testing-returning-region-plagued-Ebola-HAS-deadly-virus.html>

would better protect themselves.¹⁷ As summarized perfectly by Samantha Power, the US ambassador to the UN, “the best way to keep Americans safe is to help the West African countries fight the disease.”¹⁸

One may choose to look at these events of U.S. involvement as the beginnings of a leadership role in the epidemic. The assumption that other wealthier nations should be the ones responsible for aid and intervention would be a mistake. A single country, even if it is the United States, does not have the capability to effectively respond to a crisis like the one in West Africa without severely cutting back on its own national interests. Additionally, it does not have the means to call upon the international response to the issue. Furthermore, the country would not have been aware of the extent of the issue without organizations such as MSF or the CDC to supply data and reports from the ground.

The chronological timeline of events points out that U.S. involvement occurred after the crucial time for containment of the disease to prevent a global health emergency. The United States would never have taken an active role so early on in addressing the Ebola virus, as it had not yet presented itself as national interest. Additionally a single outside nation-state would not have the parameters and ability to control what occurs on the ground as well as among the international community as an organization like the WHO. While analyzing the U.S. involvement, it is important to acknowledge for the sake of Morgenthau’s argument, which was in the overwhelming majority of countries around the world to avoid involvement at all cost. So much that even the small island of Trinidad and Tobago followed the common practice of denying entry to any passenger coming from any country with Ebola. In fact, on August 21st South Africa was the first country to begin restricting entry for all non-citizens traveling from Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, or Sierra Leone.¹⁹

17. Carol E. Lee, “Obama to Name Ron Klain as Ebola Czar”, *The Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 2014, accessed October 20, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-name-ron-klain-as-ebola-czar-1413557184>

18. Associated Press, “Top UN Ebola official: new cases poorly tracked”, *Daily Mail*, 28 October, 2014, accessed October 29, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2810710/5-000-Ebola-health-workers-needed-West-Africa.html>

19. “Travel Security Advisories - Flight Bans and Closures”, *International SOS*, October 19, 2014, accessed October

Process Utopias

For Ken Booth, an International Relations theorist whose focus is security and theory, improvements in human rights is a part of a larger “process utopia”. As he explains, “Process utopias [...] are benign and reformist steps calculated to make a better world somewhat more probable for future generations. Trying to reduce the risk of war each year, improving human rights and spreading economic justice are examples of such policies [...] Process utopianism is thus practical utopianism.”²⁰ Booth claims an ideology invoking a utopian reality as practical. If there is an improvement of human rights and the spread of economic justice there will be a reduced risk of war resulting in a better world for future generations. Booth’s argument shows the deliberate steps a nation should take to make the world a better place with a realistic approach rather than as an ideological fantasy, crossing realism with utopianism.

If the improvement of human rights is a logical move for a democratic self-interested country that also spreads economic justice, then Booth has essentially blended Huntington’s and Dunne’s rationale for humanitarian aid and intervention. The motivation to acknowledge human rights is not only in a country’s self-interest, but conscientious about future generations and growth of all countries. The ability to use human rights as a tool for the common humanity, economic development, or a larger process utopia, is immensely compelling and warrants larger discussion.²¹

Failure of Immediate Response

When looking into the response to the Ebola epidemic during the summer months into the fall, Booth would be sorely deflated. Although no war has broken out from this conflict, attacks on aid workers due to intense fear from villagers has heightened the level of danger for those in charge of searching for

20. Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice”, *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991, July): 527-545, <http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/pdfplus/2621950.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>

21. *Ibid.*

22. Terrence McCoy, “Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at More Violence to Come” *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2014, accessed September 22, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/19/why-the-brutal-murder-of-eight-ebola-workers-may-hint-at-more-violence-to-come/>

people suffering from Ebola.²² The governments within West Africa were unable to create effective policies for their people to remain calm and to cooperate with health workers due to years of corruption evoking little trust of those in power. Economic justice is not a highlighted aspect of the epidemic; however it shows the extreme poverty and inaccessibility to basic health care. Booth's theory would also conclude that the failure of the international community to respond to the Ebola epidemic is a human rights violation.²³

When this epidemic began, the political entities in the West African nations were unable to respond appropriately to the damage the disease was causing. For instance, Liberia's government locked down a neighborhood in Monrovia to stop the spread of the virus on August 14th, which instilled panic instead of order.²⁴ An escalated version occurred a little over a month later when Sierra Leone began a three-day nationwide lockdown to halt the Ebola outbreak on September 19th.²⁵ These efforts were methods for finding those who were sick by going door to door, and removing those infected to isolated treatment camps. This action actually worsened the efforts for those looking to contain the virus, as people ran in fear of being taken away to treatment camps where so many had died. On the same day Sierra Leone began its lockdown, MSF stated that it was unlikely to stop the spread of the disease.²⁶ In fact, they made a similar statement exclusively saying that lockdowns and quarantines do not help control Ebola, on the 29th of August in response to Liberia's decision to lock down Monrovia.²⁷

The least acknowledged, and perhaps the most important, argument for intervention when concerning Ebola in West Africa is human rights. On September 2nd, the WHO regional director for Africa, Luis Gomes Sambo,

23. Sara Jerving, "Why Liberians Thought Ebola Was a Government Scam to Attract Western Aid", *The Nation*, September 16, 2014, accessed September 22, 2014, <http://www.thenation.com/article/181618/why-liberians-thought-ebola-was-government-scam-attract-western-aid#>

24. Norimitsu Onishi, "Clashes Erupt as Liberia Sets an Ebola Quarantine", *The New York Times*, August 20, 2014, accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-liberia-quarantine.html>

25. Chelsea J. Carter and Faith Karimi, "Sierra Leone starts nationwide lockdown to stop spread of Ebola", *CNN*, September 19, 2014, accessed September 19, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/world/africa/sierra-leone-ebola-lockdown/>

26. *Ibid.*

27. Adam Nossiter, "Sierra Leone to Impose 3-Day Ebola Quarantine" *The New York Times*, accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/world/africa/sierra-leone-to-impose-widespread-ebola-quarantine.html>

publicly criticized the international response on Ebola. He stated that, “isolating and stigmatizing [the worst-hit countries, is] making it difficult to transport supplies, personnel and other resources”, which inevitably makes everything worse. Many countries responded by avoiding this region of the world entirely, instead of sending aid to help solve the problem.

Conclusion

In summary of all of these arguments, the evidence shows that for an epidemic like Ebola, the main source and implication of aid and intervention needs to come from INGOs and must not rely on differing nation states as they do not have the national interests to get involved. After analyzing and following the events that brought about the current state of West African countries through battling the Ebola epidemic, one can be severely disappointed with the failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the virus until it was too late. The marking of real action came just before the first international case stemming from Texas with Eric Duncan. By then, thousands of people had died in terrible conditions and entire local health care systems were completely useless due to the loss of doctors and medical staff. Although there were organizations such as the CDC, MSF, and WHO actively participating in the efforts to contain the virus, the INGOs waited too long in hopes that a country, such as the United States, would take control over the situation. In truth, the WHO was the ideal candidate to respond with an effective leadership role to actively direct and organize specific action towards efficiently aiding those infected in West Africa.

Lying in the hands of organizations is the power to address global issues such as the Ebola epidemic; which if utilized, would enable us to conceive both a realist-utopian world Booth addresses that also encompasses Dunne’s common humanity. A leadership that plans on receiving sparing aid from various countries due to investments made from their point of national interests would actively prompt more media attention directly targeting specific countries for aid. It also is important to understand that beyond justifiable investments in the form of monetary value or health and safety supplies, outside countries

28. Adam Nossiter, “Is Taking a Second Toll, on Economies” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2014, accessed on September 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/africa/ebola-hurting-african-economies.html?_r=0

are likely to avoid any further allocation of aid or intervention. While it is essential to point out the faults in the global reaction to the West African crisis over the last few months, it is also important to learn from them. The collaboration of the CDC, MSF, and WHO could have been more effective had there been an active direct line of leadership carrying out the details of aid processes, and even more crucially, being held responsible for any failure.

Bibliography

- Bates, Dan, and Paul Thompson. "Schoolchildren Exposed in US Ebola Scare: Texas Governor Rick Perry Reveals Fears for Kids and Says 18 Americans May Have Virus After Hospital Sent Infected Man Home". *Daily Mail*, October 1, 2014. Accessed October 22, 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2775608/CDC-confirms-Dallas-patient-isolation-testing-returning-region-plagued-Ebola-HAS-deadly-virus.html>
- Booth, Ken. "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice". *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991, July): 527-545. <http://0-www.jstor.org.opac.sfsu.edu/stable/pdfplus/2621950.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>
- Buckwalter, Rebecca. "Why Hasn't Previously Successful Methods Used to Stop Ebola Working Against This New Strain?". *Pacific Standard: The Science of Society*, 4 August 2014. Accessed September 10 2014. <http://www.psmag.com/navigation/health-and-behavior/arent-previously-successful-attempts-stop-ebola-working-new-strain-87510/>
- Callimachi, Rukmini. "Fear of Ebola Drives Mob to Kill Officials in Guinea". *New York Times*, September 18, 2014. Accessed September 18, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/africa/fear-of-ebola-drives-mob-to-kill-officials-in-guinea.html>
- Dunne, Tim. "The English School". In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, 146. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Grham-Harrison, Emma. "Liberia President ask US for Help in Talking Ebola". *The Guardian*, 13 September, 2014. Accessed September 18, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/13/liberia-president-asks-us-help-ebola>
- Huntington, Samuel. "Foreign Aid: For What and for Whom". *Foreign Policy*, January 1, 1971. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/30/foreign_aid_for_what_and_for_whom.

Jerving, Sara. "Why Libertarians Thought Ebola Was a Government Scam to Attract Western Aid". *The Nation*, September 16, 2014. Accessed September 22, 2014. <http://www.thenation.com/article/181618/why-liberians-thought-ebola-was-government-scam-attract-western-aid#>

Karimi, Faith, and Chelsea Carter. "Sierra Leone Starts Nationwide Lockdown to Stop Spread of Ebola". *CNN*, September 19, 2014. Accessed September 19, 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/world/africa/sierra-leone-ebola-lockdown/>

Lee, Carol E. "Obama to Name Ron Klain as Ebola Czar". *The Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 2014. Accessed October 20, 2014. <http://online.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-name-ron-klain-as-ebola-czar-1413557184>

McCoy, Terrence. "Why the Brutal Murder of Several Ebola Workers May Hint at More Violence to Come". *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2014. Accessed September 22, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/19/why-the-brutal-murder-of-eight-ebola-workers-may-hint-at-more-violence-to-come/>

Morgenthau, Hans J. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene?" *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (1967, April): 430. Accessed September 23, 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23877/hans-j-morgenthau/to-intervene-or-not-to-intervene>

Nossiter, Adam. "Sierra Leone to Impose 3-Day Ebola Quarantine". *The New York Times*, September 6, 2014. Accessed September 12, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/world/africa/sierra-leone-to-impose-wide-spread-ebola-quarantine.html>

O'Grady, Siobhan. "Colonial Line Drawn Again for Ebola Aid". *Foreign Policy*, 22 September, 2014. Accessed September 23, 2014. http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/09/22/colonial_lines_drawn_again_for_ebola_aid

Onishi, Norimitsu. "Clashes Erupt as Liberia Sets an Ebola Quarantine". *The New York Times*, August 20, 2014. Accessed September 12, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-liberia-quarantine.html>

“Peace & Security Council Report”. Institute for Security Studies, September, 2014. Accessed October 12, 2014. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/RAPPORTCPS/41_en~v~Rapport_sur_le_CPS_-_No__62.pdf

Sung, Lena, Bradly Dennis, Lenny Bernstein and Joey Achenbach. “Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations Failed to Stop the Ebola Disaster”, *The Washington Post*, October 4, 2014. Accessed October 10, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/10/04/how-ebola-sped-out-of-control/>

“Travel Security Advisories - Flight Bans and Closures”. International SOS, October 19, 2014. Accessed October 20, 2014. https://www.international-sos.com/ebola/index.cfm?content_id=435&language_id=ENG

“Why Ebola is so Dangerous”. *BBC*, October 8, 2014. Accessed October 10, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26835233>

“WHO: Ebola Outbreak ‘International Public Health Emergency’”. *Deutsche Welle*, August 8, 2014. Accessed September 27, 2014. <http://www.dw.de/who-ebola-outbreak-international-public-health-emergency/a-17840752>

“2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa”. *CDC*, September 25, 2014. Accessed September 30, 2014. <http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/previous-updates.html>

ABSTRACT » *This production will analyze the genesis, development and impact of Immigration Theater on the integration of migrants into their host society. The massive influx of immigrants through Ellis Island left New York City with a large immigrant population in need of a way to develop their identity outside of their host nation. Using Immigration Theater and the “power of performance”² as a loudspeaker for the immigrant voice and struggle, the immigrants of New York City have found a method of developing their identity, self-expression, and reaching out to other immigrants. This creates a safe space for all of these happen in their new community. I will set the scene with a brief history of Ellis Island and its immigration policy, which will lead into its impact on New York City’s immigrant theater scene. Several immigrant plays and their impact will be reviewed, as well as organizations that facilitate Immigrant Theater, a scholarly response to Immigrant Theater, and the response of the international community.*

.....

All The World's A Stage

» by Crystal O'Connor

Production Staff (Research):

The Immigrants' Theatre Project (ITP) in New York City has been producing stage performances directed at giving immigrants a voice since 1988.¹ Marcy Arlin founded the project with the hope that immigrants who have been marginalized will gain their "public theatrical voice,"² breakdown stereotypes³ and that theater in this form will be a method for intercultural relations⁴ in a multicultural city. She believed that theater would

expose the truth about the experiences of immigrants.⁵

Through the conscious effort to integrate immigrants into the American life, immigrants are faced with

isolationism and a lack of understanding by American citizens. A production called "Unexpected Journeys" by ITP focused on this slow development of the immigrant experience in New York City. "It was crucial to illustrate how the immigrant experience has remained the same ... over 300 years

1 Rosche, Daniela and Steven Hawkins, "A New UN Agency for Women: Time for Impact 'The Coffee Dance': Interactive Theatre for Social Change with Nicaraguan Immigrants in Costa Rica: Compiled by Liz Cooke," *Gender and Development* 19, no. 1 (2011): 143-52.

2. Arlin, Immigrants' Theater Project, last modified 2012, <http://www.immigrants theat.org/about.cfm>.
3. Anne O'Connell, "The Immigrants' Theater Project," last modified, March 1, 2002. <http://www.immigrants theat.org/review.cfm?REV=2>.
4. Arlin, Immigrants' Theater Project.
5. O'Connell, "The Immigrants' Theater Project."
6. Sarach, Marian, "Unexpected Journey's at the Immigration Project," Last modified February 1, 2002, <http://www.immigrants theat.org/review.cfm?REV=3>.
7. Arlin, Immigrants' Theater Project.
8. O'Connell, "The Immigrants' Theater Project."
9. Maddern, J. F., "Spectres Of Migration And The Ghosts Of Ellis Island," *Cultural Geographies* 15, no. 3, (2008): 359-81.
10. Frank, Leah, "THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants' Tales." *New York Times*, THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants' Tales, (1992).

of American history, and to use quality art to promote understanding and fight against intolerance and bigotry focused on newcomer immigrants.”⁶ Efforts such as these are slowly bridging the social gap for immigrants in New York City.

The Immigrants’ Theater Project strives to continue this trend by casting actors of diverse origins which gives an authentic representation of the American melting pot of immigrants⁷ to the organization. Arlin “came to realize the centrality of the immigrant’s story to the New York and, indeed, the American experience.”⁸ The ITP has covered a wide variety of immigrant group productions, each focusing on a different immigrant struggle.

Setting and Cast (Background & Policy Analysis)

They open with New York City, the recipient city of nearly 16 million immigrants between the years 1892 and 1924⁹ via Ellis Island. While “...getting into America was frequently as hard, if not harder, than getting to America in the first place,”¹⁰ immigrants poured in by the droves, and New York City became the American melting pot of foreign influence. This foreign influence would later make its theatrical debut through the voices of immigrants on stage.

Although originally behind an ominous border for immigrants to cross, New York City is the home now to more foreign born immigrants than any other city in the world.¹¹ At the end of 2013, the city was declared to be home to 3.07 million immigrants, higher than the number of people living in Chicago.¹² This extremely diverse group of immigrants, with no dominant ethnic group call New York City their home.

How did this region, once controlled by the British Naval forces during the American Revolution then become the largest amalgamation of immigrants in the world? The answer lies in immigration policy reform and the massive exodus of European citizens that left their homelands and were filtered through Ellis Island into New York. To understand how this influenced New York’s transformation into “the world city,”¹³ it is necessary to look at the evolution of Ellis Island’s role in United States immigration reform.

11. Mathias, Christopher, “More Foreign-Born Immigrants Live In NYC Than There Are People In Chicago,” *The Huffington Post*, (2013).

12. *Ibid.*

During the late 19th century New York was the city that held so much promise for immigrants, despite the treatment immigrants potentially faced upon arrival. When Ellis Island reopened in 1990, the difficult experiences of immigrants from Europe were revisited: “In its Historic Structure Report, the National Park Service said of the station: ‘While a ‘Portal of Hope and Freedom’ for many, it was an ‘Island of Tears’ for those who were turned away, when they failed to meet the requirements of the immigration laws and regulations.’”¹⁴ New York City and the United States awaited immigrants behind a seemingly inaccessible immigrant station, but to many, the trip was worth it.

During the Revolutionary War the British occupied New York City and were the gatekeepers to the territory via Ellis Island and the surrounding areas. The freedom and governance from the British was assumed during this time. This led the United States to purchase the island from New York State in 1808.¹⁵ Nearly a century after its acquisition by the federal government, Ellis Island began to see a huge increase in the number of immigrants from Greece, Italy, Russia, Poland and Hungary.¹⁶ Millions of Europeans made the journey across the Atlantic Ocean in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s in hopes of being greeted by a 300 foot statue and lenient border control. Ellis Island became the hub for European immigrants during this time and New York City often subsequently became their home. In 1890 Ellis Island was declared the first Federal Immigration station, and this is when it saw over 16 million immigrants (between the years 1892 and 1924).¹⁷

During this time, the immigration process of Ellis Island became exceedingly efficient. The busiest years, (1898 to 1915) saw 5,000 immigrants processed per day.

Even in light of the massive flow of immigrants, it was not always easy to enter the United States. At times immigrants brought in diseases or did not produce complete immigrant papers. Through this the United States responded

13. Ibid.

14. Robert F. Zeidel “Ellis Island and the American Immigration Experience.” USA Today, (1992), sec. 121.2568.

15. “Ellis Island - A Brief History of Events.” The Statue of Liberty & Ellis Island, January 1, 2015, <http://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/ellis-timeline>.

16. David, Oshinsky “REVIEW; When Ellis Island Was the Only Portal,” The New York Times, August 31, 2000.

17. J. F. Maddern, “Spectres Of Migration And The Ghosts Of Ellis Island,” Cultural Geographies

with the creation of early immigration policies. “Laws were passed excluding immigrants with a criminal past, a mental deficiency, or a communicable disease. The Bureau of Immigration was created, along with 24 federal inspection stations, to process new arrivals and weed out those deemed medically suspect, politically subversive, or unlikely to find a job.”¹⁹ After traveling in terrible conditions across an ocean, immigrants were greeted with these high standards of entry along with interrogation and occasional hot meals. With so much resistance pushing against them, it is a wonder that only 2% of immigrants were rejected at the border. Even more so that today at least 40% of Americans can trace at least once ancestor to Ellis Island.²⁰

The beginning of the 20th century welcomed millions of immigrants. The days of welcoming thousands of immigrants per day began to fade by the First World War. During WWI, the United States’ attitude towards immigrants became increasingly negative and Ellis Island became a lookout point for unwanted immigrants. Deportation, literacy tests and strict racial guidelines were implemented during this time as a result of anti-immigration sentiment.²¹ The elitist attitude was strengthened when the demographic of immigrants changed. What was once an influx of western Europeans changed to southern and eastern Europeans from the late 1800’s to World War I. “This change triggered the explosive passions of racial and religious prejudice, fears of revolutionary contagion, class conflict, and other deep-seated animosities against the newcomers who appeared to threaten the value system known as ‘American.’”²² Many ethnicities and demographics were refused during this time as nationalism was growing.

The continuous flow of immigrants into the United States during the late 1800’s and early 1900’s was ancient history by the end of World War I. “The Bolshevik Revolution, the Red Scare of 1919, disillusionment with America’s participation in World War I -- all raised anti-immigrant feelings at home. Congress passed the National Origins Act in 1924, which used a quota system to slash immigration from central and southern Europe. The Great Depression of the 1930’s further slowed this process, and, when Ellis Island closed for good in 1954, the United States contained the smallest percentage of foreign-born residents in its history.”²³ President Warren G. Harding chose to sign the Immi-

18. Oshinsky, “REVIEW; When Ellis Island Was the Only Portal.”

19. Ibid.

20. “Ellis Island,” History.com, <http://www.history.com/topics/ellis-island>.

21. Ibid.

22. Schuck, Peter. “The Transformation of Immigration Law.” *Columbia Law Review* 84 (1984).

gration Quota Act²⁴ due to “booming post-war immigration results in 590, 971 people passing through Ellis Island. According to the new law, annual immigration from any country cannot exceed 3 percent of the total number of immigrants from a country living in the U.S. in 1910.”²⁵ The history of thousands of immigrants that came through Ellis Island began to fade to a distant memory as the United States once again tightened its borders to foreign infiltration..

During this time the country reverted back to classical immigration policy, inspired by its intolerance of strangers.²⁶ This period in history shaped the way the United States, and therefore New York approached immigration policy. It would take several decades for the United States’ immigrant population to rise from this low.

Policy Overview

There are conflicting views on the motivation of the United States to change the immigration policy in Ellis Island. Here I will examine Schuck and his description of the shift in immigration reform from liberal to classic. I will compare Schuck with Hirota who analyzes the United States’ need to balance between humanitarian immigration reform and pauper deportation.

Schuck states that in the early years of the United States’ formation the founding citizens had the responsibility of populating the immense territory that they had acquired from Britain. Therefore, Schuck says, “Liberal ideology was reflected in a policy of essentially open borders, one that strongly encouraged, indeed actively recruited, mass immigration to the United States.”²⁷ This invitation had resounding effects for decades to come, even though the policy

changed dramatically once America felt the threat of immigrant and foreign infiltration. Schuck states the nation’s immigrant policy transformed from liberal to classical to protect its borders. According to Schuck, “Immigration law often implicates the nation’s basic foreign policy objectives...”²⁸ and in the case of Ellis Island, we see a nation trying to preserve its newly found independence from Europe.

23. Oshinsky, “REVIEW; When Ellis Island Was the Only Portal.”

24. “Ellis Island,” History.com.

25. Ibid.

26. Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law.”

27. Ibid.

28. Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law.”

29. Ibid.

According to Schuck, this led the government to be increasingly more involved and regulatory in Ellis Island's regulation process in the late 1800's, and the immigrants were forced to pledge allegiance to the United States to gain access to basic freedoms. "Consent remained the source of an alien's legal rights and duties, but it was no longer liberalism's consent of freely contracting individuals exercising their natural rights to define their own relationships with others. Restrictive nationalism drew upon the ideological conception of consent-based obligation, but reshaped it to respond to the dictates of an exclusionary sentiment."²⁹ Restrictive nationalism is Schuck's manner of describing the elitist attitude of American natives that influenced selective immigration policies.

However, Schuck does not agree with this conservative, nationalistic way of implementing immigration law. "Immigration law should be made to embody the more universalistic norms, the more specious conception of legal and moral community, to which liberalism and contemporary public law aspire."³⁰ Eventually, Schuck's hopes of liberal immigration laws would be reflected in New York City gaining the title of the "world city"³¹ and housing more immigrants than any other city in the world.

Hirota claims that the change in New York immigration policy did not only occur because of strict nationalism, but also from the United States recognizing the reality of immigrants making the journey to the United States, and the sudden urgency of regulating this influx. "The development of immigration control in New York suggests that the legislature responded to two kinds of foreign poverty in different ways. Legislators regarded immigrants' poverty as a social and moral problem, but they saw the practical and humanitarian necessity of accommodating poor immigrants who came to the United States on their own."³³ She goes on to say that policy makers were not sympathetic of paupers that had remained in the United States and exhibited very low civic participation and held little promise of being contributing members of the newly developing country. This angered American nationalists who did not agree with paupers taking advantage of the citizenship they had undergone so much hardship to attain.

The disgruntled voice of American born workers eventually became too loud for the federal government. "In 1885, the federal government passed the

30. Schuck, "The Transformation of Immigration Law."

31. Mathias, "More Foreign-Born Immigrants Live In NYC Than There Are People In Chicago."

32. Ibid.

Foran Act, prohibiting the landing of unskilled workers under labor contract signed abroad whose emigration was assisted by their American employers. The act was a response to pressure from native-born workers who resented competition with cheap foreign contract labor.³³ Hirota clearly distinguishes between intolerance for paupers and the United States' desire to maintain good relations with its immigrant community.

Hirota says that New York responded to the native complaints with the limited deportation law of 1880. She says this law "can be interpreted as a compromise for policy makers that appeased the nativists without offending their immigrant constituencies."³⁵ According to Hirota, the United States, by way of New York had a relatively relaxed immigrant policy during this time. "The principal explanation for New York's moderate approach to immigration restriction is surely the sheer volume of immigration to New York."³⁶ New York handled the influx of immigrants by appeasing both its native citizens and those trying to begin a new life beyond Ellis Island.

While the United States tightened its borders and immigration policy, the days of Ellis Island left a resounding cultural and political effect. The influx of culture and heritage combined with the fear of the immigrants' legacy being lost into American convention³⁷ produced a very intentional method of self-expression during the time of immigration through Ellis Island. "Identities were consciously performed, both in an attempt to define oneself with a suddenly

burgeoning city that played a leading role in the nation's project to describe itself, and as a way of passing, functioning, making a living and surviving in a society increasingly touchy about race and ethnicity."³⁸ This is how immigrants or migrants develop and maintain their identities, relate to their host communities, and make sure their voices are heard in a city full of many diverse voices that want the same recognition and respect.

The Response

33. Hidetaka Hirota, "The Great Entrepot for Mendicants": Foreign Poverty and Immigration Control in New York State to 1882," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, (2010), 5-32.

34. Hirota, "The Great Entrepot for Mendicants": Foreign Poverty and Immigration Control in New York State to 1882," 5-32.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. Sarach, "Unexpected Journey's at the Immigration Project."

New York responded by giving immigrants the stage; an open platform of expression of culture and identity. “When they came they brought with them centuries of music and drama that they had incorporated into an expression of their emotions about their adopted land.”³⁹ Performances then gave both the performers and the public a way to examine how American identity politics can be understood through the art of performance and theater.⁴⁰ In a city already heavily influenced by Broadway, a massive immigrant culture breakthrough was made using the medium of theater. Multiculturalism had taken “center stage” in New York City and the actors are immigrants.

Act III

Featuring (Case Studies):

The following section will discuss five plays that each address a different immigrant issue. They will include: Relations between immigrant groups and their host community, remembering the past, self-expression, importance of the impact of war, and conflict resolution.

The Immigrant Voice

Judith Thissen offers an explanation of New York City’s immigrant theater community during the days Ellis Island (1892 – 1902),⁴¹ specifically focusing on Yiddish immigrants. This case study provides an example of immigrants connecting with other people in the immigrant community. During this time Yiddish immigrants in New York found their political voice through theater and established their first professional Yiddish company in 1892.⁴² By 1902, the Immigrant Theater culture in New York City dramatically expanded due to the influx of performers and directors.⁴³ The community flourished and this financially lucrative, expanding, theatrical time was known as the “Golden Years”⁴⁴ of Yiddish theater. This provided a way for the Yiddish community to integrate into the host society by becoming part of the work force in New York City. However, their success and outreach was limited to Yiddish speaking citizens of New York, and they eventually encountered a lack of financial support.

38. Susan Kattwinkel, “Street Scenes: Staging the Self in Immigrant New York 1880–1924,” *Theatre Research International* 35 (2010): 82-83.

39. Frank, Leah, “THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants’ Tales.”

40. Kattwinkel, “Street Scenes: Staging the Self in Immigrant New York 1880–1924,” 82-83.

41. Judith Thissen, “Reconsidering the Decline of the New York Yiddish Theater in the Early 1900’s.” *Theater Survey - The Journal of the American Society for Theater Research* 44, no. 2 (2003): 173-97

Thissen tells us that the Yiddish community combatted this decline in success by holding outreach benefits to support Jewish and other immigrant communities in New York City. Soon the immigrant community had the support of hometown societies, trade unions and lodges⁴⁵ that would frequent the productions. “For the voluntary societies, these sponsored theatre outings, commonly known in Yiddish as benefit *abdenden* (‘benefit nights’) became a powerful vehicle to raise funds. The Yiddish playhouses also fared well by these arrangements, which persisted well into the 1930s.”⁴⁶ A city populated by an inpouring of immigrants through Ellis Island responded with a cohesive integration process almost immediately, and as Thissen shows us, this rising of Yiddish presence spawned other ethnicities in New York to respond.

The East Side housed a population of Russian/ Jewish anarchists and socialists in the late nineteenth century.⁴⁷ This group of elite living as journalists, labor activists, political leaders and writers wanted the same influence as the Yiddish thespians and in 1891, a group of journalists sought to take Yiddish theater to the next level of success. They “launched a campaign to transform the Yiddish theatre from a lowbrow entertainment appealing to Jewish sentiments into a highbrow institution of cosmopolitan art and enlightenment.”⁴⁸ Thissen shows us the impact of putting one ethnic group in spotlight, and in the case of the Russian/ Jewish East Side immigrants, there is an evident increase in international relations between immigrant communities working toward a common goal. The Russian/Jewish communities were also immigrants, and this increased the immigrant relations. This helped both communities by creating solidarity and diplomatic relations across ethnicities.

Today, New York City still produces Immigrant Theater with Yiddish and Jewish influence. Some of the most famed are “Fiddler on the Roof” and the movie “Moonstruck.” This genre of theater is known as “vaudeville” and

42. Thissen, “Reconsidering the Decline of the New York Yiddish Theater in the Early 1900’s,” 173-97.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

46. Thissen, “Reconsidering the Decline of the New York Yiddish Theater in the Early 1900’s,” 173-97.

47. Thissen, “Reconsidering the Decline of the New York Yiddish Theater in the Early 1900’s,” 173-97.

48. *Ibid.*

has become a prominent form of musical theater in New York City.⁴⁹ Leah Frank reviewed the vaudeville production “Vagabond Stars,” “...adapted from Ms. Sandrow’s book ‘Vagabond Stars: A World History of Yiddish Theater,’ [which] nestles comfortably into the theatrical body of immigrant tales.”⁵⁰ The musical play examine the struggle of an immigrant community separated from their homeland with only hand written letters sent back and forth between those that remained.

Remembering the Past

Jovanka Bach created the production of “Name Day” out of stories that she had heard as a child about the difficulties for Serbian mothers during World War II. Bach draws on the experiences of mothers who had to “smother their crying newborns to escape detection” by the Germans.⁵¹ The play focuses on two women who moved to Los Angeles after a horrifying experience in Yugoslavia; one mother chose to smother her baby, and the other chose not to which led to their detection and the murder of several people she knew.⁵²

Bach says the play had an emotional effect on her audience due to its morbid and dark content and that, “the Serbian community heard of it, and it stirred up some things.”⁵³ Remembering the past and focusing on the impact of war caused a political reaction in her audiences. While Bach does not consider herself a part of the community, she connected with that demographic because of her production. “I’m not really a part of that community; for better or worse, I’ve been assimilated. But some of them sought me out after the show: they saw political things in there I hadn’t even intended.”⁵⁴ When discussing the subject of war, each viewer has their own point of view on what is most politically relevant, and Bach created a space for people to dissect this political tragedy.

The aforementioned Immigrants’ Theatre Project had a performance of Bach’s play in 2005. The reviewer, Ellen Carpenter, said that the audience is quickly drawn “into the drama’s vortex.”⁵⁵ She supports Bach’s work and states that Bach, “keeps her concerns specific and intimate, and it’s this immediacy

49. Leah Frank, “THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants’ Tales.”

50. Ibid.

51. Janice Arakov, “Playwriting Is Her Healing Art: With ‘Name Day,’ Physician-Writer Jovanka Bach Revisits an Earlier Reign of Terror in the Former Yugoslavia,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 19, 1995.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

that gives ‘Name Day’ its particular power.”⁵⁶ Without this power, Immigrant Theater will not have an effective influence on the public is it trying to enlighten. If there is an emotional stirring in the audience, it may even cause the audience members to voice their opinions on the show, as mentioned by Bach herself.

Self-Expression

New York in addition to theater productions also features immigrant struggle through stage dance performances as well as “. The abstract performance “Translocation 9:16,” performed in 1988 was an “ambitious excursion into a world of emotions created by the difficulties of immigration,” according to Jennifer Dunning, who wrote a review of the play for the New York Times. Dunning raves about how “the choreographer brings to vivid life the transplants’ memories of home, how those memories are distorted, and the confusion of return.”⁵⁷ The story depicts a young Eskimo man and a group of Eskimos brought to New York City as “trophies.”⁵⁸ The young man eventually returns home but dies at a very young age.⁵⁹ The setting of the play is Greenland, brought to life by carefully designed set of Eskimo symbols and projected scenery.

The play allowed the Eskimo community to express its rich culture through dance and language. The Eskimo language, as well as any language, is extremely representative of the culture by showing the importance of certain words, concepts and ideologies. By focusing on the Eskimo language, the players of “Translocation 9:16” are able to use the stage as a platform for self-expression. Dunning states that “One of the evening’s most memorable moments comes with Ms. Gam’s musings on the Eskimo vocabulary, as she observes that Eskimos use a single word for such concepts as sharp-flying snow, dangerous stones and slithery paths, observing that this is a language that describes things by what is different about them.”⁶⁰ In spite of Dunning’s lukewarm review of the dance performance, she was able to learn something about an immigrant community that was not often discussed in western culture. In addition to this, the

54. Arakov, “Playwriting is her Healing Art.”

55. Ellen Carpenter, “Balkan Memories.” June 3, 2005, <http://www.immigrantstheat.org/productions.cfm>.

56. “Balkan Memories.”

57. Jennifer Dunning, “Review/Dance; Into Kaja Gam’s World Of Eskimo Memories: [Review],” The New York Times, September 5, 1988.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

Eskimo community in New York City found a way to represent their culture and express their identities in a way that was easily received by the audience.

Awareness of Impact of War

A second play produced by the ITP, “Progress” received literary support by its reviewer, Martin Denton. The play is “a potent, stark production that reminds American audiences, among other things, how fortunate we are not to live in an active battle zone like the Balkans.”⁶¹ The exact location of the play is not given, but the story unfolds after peace comes to the area and the people are free. Denton comments on the feeling of the actors portraying their satisfaction with the newly drawn border lines and their disregard for the refugees entering their land.

The story is partially told from the point of view of a soldier who was murdered during the conflict proceeding the peace. Denton praises this as, “seeing the ruined country from his (the soldier’s) point of view, representing the unnamed thousands whose bodies lie heaped under the soil, victims of countless wars.”⁶² Denton says that the staging of “Progress” does not pacify the American audience about uncomfortable truths about immigration and the horrors of war. He promotes the effect that both plays had on him and the audience by claiming “...these are plays that make us sad, but they also make us think and perhaps even compel us to discussion or action after they’re over. We have much to learn from the drama created beyond the English-speaking world, as these two fine examples demonstrate. Bravo to Arlin and Morgan for bringing these to the New York stage.” The Immigrants’ Theater Project once again brought awareness to an English-speaking reviewer of the truth about immigration. Although it was not set in New York City, Denton applauds the reality shown on stage with, “progress.”

Conflict Resolution

The following case study is an example of how the genre of Immigrant Theater has started to benefit immigrants outside of the United States. Nicaraguan immigrants were able to use theater as a means of conflict resolution in their new community of San Jose, Costa Rica. This specific case is an example

60. Jennifer Dunning, “Review/Dance; Into Kaja Gam’s World Of Eskimo Memories: [Review].”

61. Martin Denton, “Heresy/Progress,” Last modified, December 9, 2006, <http://www.immigrantstheat.org/review.cfm?REV=7>.

62. “Heresy/Progress.

of how the New York City immigrant theater scene could benefit other groups of migrants across the globe.

In 2006, the Costa Rican Humanitarian Foundation used theater as part of their Dramatic Problem Solving (DPS) initiative. DPS was created to facilitate “conflict analysis and community transformation”⁶³ that arose after a massive influx of Nicaraguan immigrants began clashing with the Costa Rican population in San Jose. This group of Nicaraguans had become violent, segregated and fearful of integrating outside of their neighborhood, “La Carpio.”

DPS created a model that would allow the people of La Carpio to collaborate on conflict analysis of their situation, “focusing on merging free-form and emotional power of theatrical expression with the structure of action planning and multi-step problem solving- especially important for immigrants as they search for identity and ways to take positive action to confront and resolve conflict in their new home.”⁶⁴ The development of this model came from Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire who wanted to give the community a chance to learn outside of a set curriculum which can restrict the learning process of immigrants. With the DPS theater solution, immigrants were able to take long-term problems of their community, create a step-by-step action plan and test out real solutions on stage.

The play created by this group was called “The Coffee Dance” in reference to the large number of Nicaraguans that work in coffee plantations in Costa Rica and focused on breast cancer of the plantation workers. This had become a huge issue in the Nicaraguan community, as many did not have access to education on healthy agricultural working standards and procedures. “In this way, the Nicaraguan immigrant audience was engaged by a group of fellow immigrants about choices in life that could lead to better health.”⁶⁵ After the “rehearsal” of conflict resolution, the Nicaraguan participants felt empowered take the action plan they had developed and to go out into their community to begin problem solving with their fellow immigrants.⁶⁶

The theater group of La Carpio have since become more empowered and continue to work with the Costa Rican Humanitarian Foundation via DPS. They have since written another play called “The Dignity of Poverty” and addresses the growth of the DPS program in La Carpio as more students and volunteers

63. Rosche and Hawkins, “A New UN Agency for Women,” 152-156.

64. Ibid.

arrive to facilitate the program. In addition to their continued work in developing impactful scripts, the story of their pilot production has been turned into a documentary film, appropriately named “The Coffee Dance.”⁶⁷

Final Bow: Analysis

The transformation of the immigrant scene in New York City owes a lot to the medium of theater. As an example, the Yiddish community was able to develop an identity outside of the difficulties of their working conditions. “Not only did the theatre provide an inexpensive means of escape from the hardships of life in the ghetto and sweatshop, it also filled an important social role, bringing the community together and providing a place for people to see and be seen.”⁶⁸ To form an identity alongside other immigrants in New York was a way for the Yiddish community to “make sense of the immigrant experience”⁶⁹ and help them find a balance between the New World and all of the freedom that came with it as well as the traditions they had left behind.

This balance is a theme that can be seen in each of the case studies presented, and is vital to examining identity formation in a new community. After departing the heritage nation, immigrants bring with them a history of traditions, lifestyles, and language that all form their identity. No matter how involved in the new community an immigrant plans to be, their identity will change upon arrival. Many immigrants find this to be a difficult process and have found a way to reinvent themselves as well as connect with their culture and culture through theater. Theater has “provided a nostalgic, cathartic, and communal experience to help the community cope with feelings of homesickness, guilt and loss.” Theater in this sense was a therapeutic form of art.

The benefits of theater in each scenario have given immigrants a way to “practice” the actions that they want to see happen in their everyday lives. This is done through theater, by allowing them to pretend they have control over things like conflict resolution and identity formation. Due to the “power of perfor-

65. Rosche and Hawkins, “A New UN Agency for Women,” 152-156.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Sharon Power, “Yiddish Theatre Actresses and American Jewish Identity,” *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies*, (2012): 84-107.

69. Ibid.

mance,” immigrants become empowered as well as connected to their home and host community.

Close Curtain: Conclusion

The challenges immigrants face upon arrival into a host country are not easily dealt with. The immigrant voice has found a new method of expression, identity development and conflict resolution through Immigrant Theater. New York City, with its bustling theater scene and massive immigrant population is an ideal location for Immigrant Theater to be developed. Using the Yiddish community as a model for immigrant integration and growth, Immigrant Theater has proved to be an extremely effective tool for all groups of immigrants across the globe.

70. Sharon Power, “Yiddish Theatre Actresses and American Jewish Identity,” 84-107.

71. Daniela Rosche & Steven Hawkins, “A New UN Agency for Women: Time for Impact ‘The Coffee Dance’: Interactive Theatre for Social Change with Nicaraguan Immigrants in Costa Rica: Compiled by Liz Cooke,” 143-52.

Works Cited

- Anne O'Connell, "The Immigrants' Theater Project" Last modified, March 1, 2002. <http://www.immigrants theat.org/review.cfm?REV=2>
- Arlin, Marcy. "Immigrants' Theater Project." Last modified 2012. <http://www.immigrants theat.org/about.cfm>
- Carpenter, Ellen. "Balkan Memories." Last modified, June 3, 2005. <http://www.immigrants theat.org/review.cfm?REV=9>
- Daniela Rosche, and Steven Hawkins. "A New UN Agency for Women: Time for Impact 'The Coffee Dance': Interactive Theatre for Social Change with Nicaraguan Immigrants in Costa Rica: Compiled by Liz Cooke." *Gender and Development* 19, no. 1 (2011): 143-52.
- Denton, Martin. "Heresy/Progress." Last modified, December 9, 2006. <http://www.immigrants theat.org/review.cfm?REV=7>
- "Ellis Island - A Brief History of Events." The Statue of Liberty & Ellis Island. January 1, 2015. Accessed April 7, 2015. <http://www.libertyellis foundation.org/ellis-timeline>.
- "Ellis Island." History.com. January 1, 2015. <http://www.history.com/topics/ellis-island>.
- Emine Fisek, "." *Theater Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012).
- Frank, Leah. "THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants' Tales." *New York Times*, March 3, 1992. THEATER REVIEW; Immigrants' Tales. <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/03/nyregion/theater-review-immigrants-tales.html>
- Guyette, Elise, Fem Tavalin, and Sarah Rooker. "" A Brief Timeline of U.S. Policy on Immigration and Naturalization. 2013. http://www.flowofhistory.org/themes/movement_settlement/uspolicytimeline.php.
- Haenni, Sabine. "The Immigrant Scene: Ethnic Amusements in New York 1880-1920." University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
- Hidetaka Hirota, ""The Great Entrepot for Mendicants": Foreign Poverty and Immigration Control in New York State to 1882." *Journal of American Ethnic History*, (2010): 5-32.

Janice Arkatov, "Playwriting Is Her Healing Art: With 'Name Day,' Physican-Writer Jovanka Bach Revisits an Earlier Reign of Terror in the Former Yugoslavia." *Los Angeles Times*, November 19, 1995. http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-19/entertainment/ca-4923_1_jovanka-bach.

Jennifer Dunning. "Review/Dance; Into Kaja Gam's World Of Eskimo Memories: [Review]." *The New York Times*. September 5, 1988. <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/05/arts/review-dance-into-kaja-gam-s-world-of-eskimo-memories.html>

Judith Thissen, "Reconsidering the Decline of the New York Yiddish Theater in the Early 1900's." *Theater Survey - The Journal of the American Society for Theater Research* 44, no. 2 (2003): 173-97

Lifson, David. "The Yiddish Theatre in America." New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965.

Maddern, J. F. "Spectres Of Migration And The Ghosts Of Ellis Island." *Cultural Geographies* 15, no. 3, (2008): 359-81.

Mathias, Christopher. "More Foreign-Born Immigrants Live In NYC Than There Are People In Chicago." *The Huffington Post*, December 19, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/19/new-york-city-immigrants_n_4475197.html.

Nancy Foner, "Models of Integration in a Settler Society: Caveats and Complications in the US Case." *Patterns of Prejudice* 46 (2012): 486-99.

Oshinsky, David. "REVIEW; When Ellis Island Was the Only Portal." *The New York Times*, August 31, 2000. <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/31/technology/review-when-ellis-island-was-the-only-portal.html>.

Sarach, Marian. "Unexpected Journey's at the Immigration Project." Last modified February 1, 2002. <http://www.immigrantstheat.org/review.cfm?REV=3>

Sharon Power, "Yiddish Theatre Actresses and American Jewish Identity." *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies*, (2012): 84-107.

Schuck, Peter. "The Transformation of Immigration Law." *Columbia Law Review* 84 (1984).

Susan Kattwinkel, "Street Scenes: Staging the Self in Immigrant New York 1880–1924." *Theatre Research International* 35 (2010): 82-83.

Waters, Mary C., and Philip Kasinitz. "Immigrants in New York City: Reaping the Benefits of Continuous Immigration." *Daedalus*, (2013): 92-106.

Yahil-Wax, M. "The Miracle of Russian-Israeli Theatre: From Alienation to Identity." *Judaism* 53, no. 1-2 (2004): 95-109.

Zeidel, Robert F. "Ellis Island and the American Immigration Experience." *USA Today*, 1992, sec. 121.2568.